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FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 19 January 1993, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Celso Luiz Nunes Amorim (Brazil)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 636th plenary meeting and the first part of the 1993 session of the Conference on Disarmament. I am honoured to assume the presidency of the Conference, on behalf of Brazil, at the opening of our work this year. I pledge to all of you my cooperation and that of my own delegation in discharging the responsibilities of presiding officer. At the same time, I rely on your assistance in dealing with the important questions before us.

I take particular pleasure, as President of the Conference, in welcoming warmly two distinguished personalities who are attending this plenary meeting. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Myanmar, His Excellency U Ohn Gyaw, will be our first speaker today. The Minister has had a distinguished diplomatic career, having assumed various high positions in the foreign service of his country. He is the first career diplomat of his country to take up the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs. During the past two months, under his guidance, the Union of Myanmar has taken substantial steps in the field of Disarmament. The Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control of New Zealand, the Honourable Douglas Graham, is well known to the Conference, as he addressed us on 13 June 1991. He was thus introduced to the Conference when my predecessor stressed his active role in academic life and as a member of Parliament. On the last occasion, the Minister delivered an important statement, during which he dealt at length, among other questions, with the prohibition of chemical weapons. I am happy to receive him today, when the Conference has succeeded in concluding the Convention banning all chemical weapons.

During my consultations, the coordinators expressed the desire that the Minister be invited to deliver his statement today before we deal with all the requests from non-members for participation in the work of the Conference. Accordingly, I will be very happy to give him the floor at the appropriate time.

I should like also to welcome new colleagues who are joining us as new representatives to the Conference - Ambassador Wolfgang Hoffmann of Germany, Satish Chandra of India, Daniel Don Caroli Nanjira of Kenya and Lars Norberg of Sweden, to whom I extend our best wishes and pledge our cooperation in the work of the Conference. Last, but not least, I would like to convey to my predecessor in the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Michel Servais, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, the appreciation of my Government for the efficient manner in which he conducted our work. We recall that it was under his presidency that the Conference concluded the negotiation of the chemical weapons Convention. Ambassador Servais also deserves our admiration, and especially my own, for the efficient and objective way in which he conducted the informal consultations regarding the agenda and composition of this forum. It will be a real challenge to succeed him in this important and delicate task. At this very moment, the international community requests our evaluation of the purposes and structure of the disarmament machinery. The Conference on Disarmament is now called to respond to persistent tides of change, and this might require an extra effort on our part.

Well before the end of the negotiations on chemical weapons last year we all started to consider the future of the Conference on Disarmament. It became clear that one of the most important and fertile phases of the Conference was coming to a close and that we would be entrusted with new responsibilities. The Conference is now called upon to give its contribution to the reassessment of the multilateral arms control and disarmament machinery, to be made by the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly in the very near future. Our collective thinking is required, in particular, in relation to the report of the United Nations Secretary-General entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era" as well as the review of the agenda and composition of the CD. I trust that satisfactory recommendations will come out of our consideration of those matters and that the Conference will continue to play its important role as a negotiating body for disarmament-related issues.

During the 1992 session this plenary was addressed by high authorities of member countries. Those authorities as well as delegates to the CD had occasion to review recent world history, the important political changes we have witnessed, the end of East-West confrontation and of a bipolar world. I will only touch briefly upon those relevant issues, but I wish to stress in particular the role of democracy in the new international order. We all know that democracy is a form of organization of the State: the government of many, as referred to in Herodotus' famous account of the debate following the death of Cambyses, the Persian Emperor, in the sixth century B.C. But the impact and significance of democracy are much broader than this purely quantitative formulation implies. Recent Brazilian experience demonstrates that a State democratically organized and at peace with its neighbours needs less armaments. Scarce resources can thus be spared in favour of urgent development tasks.

The aspirations of Brazil as regards international security can be summarized in the words disarmament, democracy and development. And I might recall, in order to stress the evolution as well as the continuity of our national thought in this regard, that 30 years ago our delegations to different international forums were insisting on a similar triad: disarmament, development and decolonization.

This is neither the moment nor the place to engage in a lengthy discussion on the interrelation between development and peace, which was already expressed with great simplicity by Pope Paul VI a quarter of a century ago. It is not possible, however, for any observer of the international scene to ignore the amazing coincidence, in today's world, between regions of tension and situations of underdevelopment. It can safely be said that the two world wars of this century as well as the cold war were basically conflicts involving the economically powerful of the day, but today's conflicts tend to involve people and States from the poverty-stricken periphery, even when the periphery is not physically that distant from the powerful and wealthy centres.

The realizations that the world has changed, that bipolarity has disappeared and that a new framework of power has replaced the old opposing

(The President)

forces are not enough. There is a long way ahead of us, leading to progressive democratization in all aspects of human life. In our view, as we follow the path to democracy, disarmament will be easier to achieve as Governments naturally tend to turn their attention to the well-being of their populations. Democracy, however, should not be seen as a purely internal matter. It is now widely accepted that the nature of international relations does not allow for the absolute isolation of issues in the internal and external spheres. This is clearer in the complex questions pertaining to the environment, human rights and security. Regarding such issues of interest to all, the decision-making process has to provide for the participation of all members of the international community.

It is true that efficiency may require limits to participation in decision-making in certain circumstances. It is no less true, however, that decisions on delicate and vital issues can only be considered legitimate, in its moral as well as political (Weberian) sense, when taken through democratic processes, in which adequate representation is assured to all. In this era of change and revolution in patterns of thought, our concept of democracy extends beyond the internal sphere of the State to reach the international political process, as an indispensable element of the new order to be built in the aftermath of the cold war.

In the past three years, the historic process has taken unforeseen routes. Alliances were broken, polarizations changed and ideologies faded in a most impressive movement, as if history had violently accelerated its pace. In a couple of years the political and geographical map of Europe was altered, and is still changing. Many of its features, inherited from the Second World War and even before, disappeared at a glance. Unfortunately, the process has not always been a peaceful one. Ethnic and religious confrontation and the revival of extreme forms of nationalism replaced East-West tensions, creating new uncertainties and widespread anguish. Every day we have to re-learn the lesson that, contrary to what has been said, history did not end.

After the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis, the way chosen by the international community to solve conflicts broke new ground in the United Nations system, with the Security Council authorizing the use of force to guarantee the implementation of its decisions. The message that a new order is being created for the maintenance of peace and security comes as a very clear one. This should then be the right moment to reassess the decision-making mechanisms of the United Nations system and to draw up criteria and regulations for the use of force, which should in no way become the general rule for the maintenance of peace. In our view, preventing conflicts continues to be more important than settling them ex post.

In recent years we have witnessed a tendency to consider international problems from the sole point of view of the developed world. This is a retrogression in the perception of international forces which seriously distorts reality. The thrust towards change should avoid the misconception

that peace under the new international order comes from America, passes through Europe and goes to the East. This misperception of our reality

(The President)

blatantly ignores the southern half of the world. In fact, peace in the world will not be assured as long as its wealth is so unevenly distributed and poverty continues to be the sign under which the vast majority of the planet's population go on living or, for that matter, dying. In this sense, the exclusion of the southern hemisphere from scenarios built upon recent proposals of international cooperation and investment flows is certainly a cause for concern.

A strong non-proliferation regime is an important element for the maintenance of security. There are, however, different views on what should constitute an ideal regime. For Brazil, it should be much more comprehensive than the existing one. There is today a nuclear non-proliferation regime based on the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the non-proliferation Treaty, the Treaty of Rarotonga and the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. It is not - and no one would expect it to be - a regime totally free from loopholes. Another regime limiting the use of chemical and biological weapons is found in the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The biological weapons Convention is also of importance, but there is wide recognition that the lack of appropriate verification mechanisms makes it less than optimal. My Government hopes that this deficiency can be corrected in the near future, in the course of the work of the ad hoc group of governmental experts established by the second BWC review conference. There is, finally, the more comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons foreseen in the Convention which was negotiated in this Conference and opened for signature in Paris last week.

The Conference on Disarmament should pursue its efforts towards the creation of a broader system, capable of reducing the number of all weapons of mass destruction, with a view to their total elimination, and prohibiting the testing of such weapons. The creation of a comprehensive regime may not be immediately in sight, but it should be recognized that a window of opportunity to that end is now open. And we may choose an approach based on the concept of building blocks, so as to gradually achieve these broad non-proliferation objectives. Each sectoral disarmament agreement, multilaterally agreed and with appropriate verification mechanisms, should be part of the non-proliferation regime we envisage. Transparent rules, multilaterally negotiated, should be added to those agreements, in order to regulate, in a safe and non-discriminatory way, international transfers of dual-use technology. With rules which are equally valid for all, it will be easier to prevent non-peaceful uses of the so-called sensitive technologies. At the same time, such rules must not create excessive or unjustifiable obstacles to the legitimate use of technology for development needs.

One of the first steps towards a full-scope non-proliferation regime should be the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting once and for all the testing of nuclear weapons. Declarations coming from nuclear-weapon States expressing their

intention to limit or suspend those tests are most welcome. The announcement by President Mitterrand just last week concerning the readiness of the French Government to suspend its nuclear tests indefinitely as long as other nuclear-weapon States follow the same path was wholeheartedly welcomed

(The President)

by Brazil. However, it would be regrettable if such promising initiatives did not carry enough political force to ensure their translation into binding multilateral commitments.

Interesting positions were heard in the plenary of the Conference on Disarmament last year with regard to the prohibition of nuclear tests. I would like to recall two of them. Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, of Germany, said: "We consider it necessary to achieve, at long last, a negotiating mandate for a test-ban agreement. An agreement banning nuclear explosions for test purposes must be concluded at the earliest possible moment". Along the same lines, Ambassador Bruno Bottai, Secretary-General of the Ministry of External Relations of Italy, stated: "Italy, having long shared the view that the elimination of nuclear testing cannot be dissociated from the problem of the size of existing arsenals, is therefore of the view that conditions are now ripe to pursue, from a technical as well as from a political perspective, the objective of a total ban on nuclear testing, through reliable means of verification".

The great majority of countries seem to agree with the gist of those statements. This is in fact the message contained in successive resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, carried with great support, which reiterate in no unclear terms the instruction to the Conference on Disarmament to conclude a treaty banning nuclear tests for ever, in all environments. The aspiration of the international community cannot be expressed in a more eloquent way. It should be heard by all.

It should be a matter of juridical as well as political logic to complement the non-proliferation Treaty with a total ban on nuclear tests, thus making it a more balanced instrument. The preamble of the Treaty already calls for that prohibition. If concrete steps are taken in that direction, together with agreement on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate their arsenals, we will surely be brought nearer to a more effective and universally accepted non-proliferation regime.

My country has already decided not to conduct any kind of nuclear test, not even the tests for supposedly peaceful purposes foreseen in the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The same commitment was entered into by Argentina and Brazil in their agreement for the exclusively peaceful uses of nuclear energy, adopted in Guadalajara, Mexico, on 18 July 1991.

My Government is promoting additional initiatives in the nuclear field and, in coordination with other interested Latin American countries, is taking the last steps towards bringing the Treaty of Tlatelolco fully into force.

Brazil shares the willingness of most countries to contribute to the establishment of a comprehensive non-proliferation regime. This requires a constructive approach from those few countries possessing weapons of mass destruction. The countries that have non-proliferation commitments have the right and are morally entitled to request from the military Powers legal disarmament commitments, vertical non-proliferation obligations and the prohibition of testing of weapons of mass destruction.

(The President)

It is the intention of my country to go on reminding the nuclear-weapon States of their primary responsibility towards disarmament. We are convinced that the continued existence of nuclear weapons and the absence of a firm and total prohibition constitute per se incentives to potential proliferators. We certainly welcome the initiatives of the two major nuclear Powers to reduce their nuclear arsenals, as embodied in the START I and START II treaties. But at the same time we are bound to say that, however important, they are but initial steps for other agreements, broader in scope and multilaterally negotiated.

The deep changes witnessed in the international scene require a less armed world. It is not easy to understand why countries of the developed world, even some considered to be neutral, have substantially increased their military expenditures. We doubt this can be the best option for the security interests of any region of the world, not least those that are once again the stages of conflicts and tensions. The Brazilian people cannot but express its disappointment at renewed armament policies as well as its deep concern with the dangerous implications of the excessive accumulation of weapons. Likewise we see no justification for countries which insist on allocating extraordinarily high levels of resources for more and more sophisticated defence programmes, some of which seem to be aiming at preventing attacks from imaginary enemies. With less than 0.5 per cent of its gross domestic product allocated for military purposes, in addressing this matter, Brazil has the authority of someone who is preaching by example.

We are convinced that a strong and comprehensive non-proliferation regime will help the promotion of international security and the maintenance of peace. The regime will however remain incomplete as long as democratic Governments do not ensure that decisions can be adopted, in the international sphere, also in a truly democratic way.

I am fully aware that as President of this Conference it is my duty to be impartial, and you can count on me for that. But I will not miss the opportunity of sharing with you my thoughts and presenting to you in a fair and clear fashion the positions of my Government.

The wish of this President and that of the Brazilian delegation is to promote and confirm the excellence of the Conference on Disarmament as the multilateral negotiating body of the United Nations disarmament machinery.

I should like to inform you that the consultations which I have been conducting on a number of organizational matters lead me to believe that we should be able to start work on substantive matters soon. Once we have listened to the speakers inscribed to address the plenary, I shall invite the Conference to hold a brief informal meeting to discuss the arrangements that we need to put in place in order to advance our work. We shall immediately afterwards resume the plenary meeting to place on record the understanding of the Conference on these arrangements. In the coming days I will continue to consult with the members on other pending organizational questions.

(The President)

I shall now invite the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United-Nations, Ambassador Vicente Berasategui, to read out a message which has been addressed to us by the Secretary-General, Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali.

Mr. BERASATEGUI (Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): The following is the text of the message from the Secretary-General of the United Nations Boutros Boutros-Ghali to the 1993 session of the Conference on Disarmament:

"It gives me great pleasure to address a message to the Conference as it opens its 1993 session.

"Just a week ago in Paris, in my capacity as Depositary, I opened for signature the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. For the States represented here and for all of you personally, this historic achievement was the culmination of 20 years of difficult negotiations. I congratulate all of you for your hard work to this end. It has been of great satisfaction to me that the Conference decided to entrust the Secretary-General of the United Nations with the responsibilities of Depositary of this unprecedented agreement.

"The Convention represents the first multilateral post-cold-war agreement in the field of disarmament and its provisions on the destruction and elimination of these devastating weapons of mass destruction, as well as on international verification, are a new benchmark for future arms limitation agreements. We should aim for universal adherence to this Convention.

"The dramatic changes which have occurred over the past few years in the international political situation have undoubtedly helped facilitate the

negotiations and final agreement on this Convention. As I said in my report 'New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era' on the occasion of Disarmament Week, which I am transmitting to you, few aspects of international life have changed more profoundly in recent years than the pursuit of arms regulation and disarmament.

"But it is not the case that disarmament was a facet of the cold war which is no longer centrally relevant to international security needs. While it is true that some important arms limitation agreements were concluded during those years, the end of the cold war has brought disarmament back on to the centre-stage.

"Your success in achieving a complete and effective ban on all chemical weapons is proof of that. The signature of the new strategic arms reduction Treaty (START 2), which will reduce by some 70 per cent the number of nuclear warheads of the two major Powers, is another milestone in disarmament. The elimination of ground-based multiple-warhead missiles removed, at a stroke, the fear of a

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first strike, and thus defuses the arms race. This Treaty, referred to by many as the most extensive nuclear arms limitation agreement to date, because of its drastic reductions in submarine-launched missiles as well, brings nuclear disarmament out of the realm of dreams and into reality.

"The previous balance of power between two military Powers has been replaced by instability and volatility in many regions of the globe. It is therefore appropriate for the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, to take bold steps to examine in depth, at this crucial time, what direction it will take, in order to make a decisive contribution to making the world safer and more secure for all. In addition to its vital role in contributing to international peace and security, the process of multilateral disarmament is an integral part of peace-making and peace-keeping, with which the United Nations has been entrusted in increasing areas of the world. If the multilateral disarmament machinery is to be effective, it must respond to the needs of the post-cold war era.

"Following the presentation and discussion of my report in the First Committee, the General Assembly decided to reconvene meetings of the First Committee, for a week in March to reassess the multilateral arms control and disarmament machinery. I look forward to receiving the views of Member States on my report, and to the discussion in the resumed First Committee session of the results of its consideration by the Conference on Disarmament, as well as its review of its agenda, composition and methods of work. I encourage you to find satisfactory solutions to these questions, as

responsibility for recommendations on the future of this body lies within its own purview.

"I suggested in my report that the efforts of the Conference on Disarmament should be focused on well-defined and urgent issues. The Conference should now take advantage of the momentum created by the successful conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention to make progress on a number of issues.

"Given the achievement of the momentous START 2 agreement, the increase in accessions to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, and the moratoria on nuclear testing in place in a number of nuclear-weapons States, it would seem a propitious time for the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its efforts towards a comprehensive nuclear test free ban. A halt to the testing of such weapons would give further impetus to the objective of total nuclear disarmament. In the meantime, the question of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States should be pursued with renewed vigour.

"Transparency in armaments is an important new focus of the Conference's efforts. As you know from my report, I believe that confidence-building in the military sphere will be an important part of

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United Nations activities in disarmament in the future. The Conference on Disarmament has a role to play in the overall picture. Efforts begun in 1992 should be continued and intensified.

"The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms will be activated in 1993 as States will be making their submissions. The Panel of Experts' report helped to refine the reporting procedures. The Conference on Disarmament could certainly make a very useful contribution to this Register by addressing the question of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms, for example, by establishing universal and non-discriminatory practical ways of increasing openness and transparency. I look forward to receiving the views of the Conference on Disarmament on this item, especially in the light of the review I have been requested to undertake in 1994.

"To prevent an arms race in outer space, the Conference might intensify its examination of all the relevant issues, particularly in the field of confidence-building measures.

"In my report, I expressed the hope that the international community will achieve more equitable and comprehensive approaches to responsible proliferation control. I hope that members of the Conference will continue

this informal dialogue on these issues, leading to a formalization of the discussions in order to move on to concrete and concerted agreements.

"Just one year ago, the members of the Security Council held an extraordinary summit meeting and reaffirmed their belief that progress in the fields of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation could make a crucial contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security. The Council expressed its commitment to take concrete steps to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations in these areas.

"I am sure that the Conference on Disarmament will respond to the recommendations and suggestions put forward in the statement by the President at that unique summit meeting. I invite the Conference to advance towards these goals."

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for transmitting the message of Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali. May I ask Ambassador Berasategui to transmit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations our deep appreciation for his important contribution to our work?

The Secretary-General of the United Nations has also addressed to us two communications. By a letter dated 24 December 1992, he transmitted his report entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era", which I already referred to in my own speech. This communication is circulated as document CD/1176. In addition, by another

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letter dated 29 December 1992, the Secretary-General transmitted the resolutions and decisions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session. The relevant communication is being circulated in all official languages as document CD/1177.

I have on my list of speakers for this meeting the representatives of the Union of Myanmar, New Zealand, Mexico, the Netherlands, the United States of America and Belgium. I now give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Myanmar, His Excellency U Ohn Gyaw.

U OHN GYAW (Myanmar): Mr. President, thank you very much for your kind words of welcome. Allow me at the very outset to offer you my warmest congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of this important body of the Conference on Disarmament. I wish you every success in carrying out your heavy responsibilities. We pledge our fullest cooperation and support in the advancement of the work of the CD under your presidency.

I also take this opportunity to express our deep appreciation to your predecessor Ambassador Servais of Belgium for the able and effective manner in

which he guided the work of the CD during the concluding month of the 1992 session and the inter-sessional period.

We should like to note with appreciation the distinguished and dedicated services extended by Ambassador Berasategui, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, and his efficient staff which have made possible the smooth and well-organized functioning of the work of the CD.

The 1993 session of the CD is taking place at a time of momentous changes on the international political scene. One of these changes in the field of disarmament was the signing of the START II Treaty by the Presidents of the United States and the Russian Federation in Moscow on 3 January. Under the new Treaty the two major nuclear-weapon States have agreed to undertake the deepest cuts thus far in their respective nuclear arsenals. We welcome the START II Treaty as an important landmark in the history of arms limitations and disarmament. We look forward to the signatories taking necessary measures towards the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty.

In view of the recent developments in the field of disarmament, it is high time to reassess the role played by multilateral forums dealing with disarmament, including the CD. To start with, I should like to express my thoughts on the work of the CD. Since the establishment in 1962 of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC), this multilateral negotiating forum has over the past 30 years undergone a process of metamorphosis, culminating in the present negotiating body of the Conference on Disarmament. The CD and its predecessor bodies have produced over the past three decades a number of important multilateral disarmament agreements. Nobody can contest the crucial importance of those disarmament agreements or the magnitude of the contribution made by the CD and its predecessor bodies in this area.

Negotiations in the CD have produced two disarmament agreements banning the two categories of weapons of mass destruction, which not only limit those

(U Ohn Gyaw, Myanmar)

arms but are also aimed at the total elimination of those horrendous weapons. I am, of course, referring to the 1972 biological weapons Convention, and the 1993 chemical weapons Convention. I am happy to say that my country was one of the original signatories at the signing ceremony in Paris in which I personally took part only a few days ago. Now that the questions of those two weapons of mass destruction are off the agenda of the CD, we are of the view that this body will do well to concentrate its efforts on nuclear issues on its agenda. In this regard, we firmly believe that the CD should continue its role as the single multilateral negotiating forum dealing with disarmament. My delegation at the same time recognizes the undiminishing important role played by the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. It should continue to play its primary role and increase its function as a deliberative body dealing with disarmament and security issues.

Myanmar has consistently pursued an independent and active foreign policy based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence. At the tenth Non-Aligned summit meeting in Jakarta in September 1992, Myanmar resumed its participation in the Non-Aligned Movement. As a founder member we have always cherished and adhered to the principles of the Movement and we are confident that we will be able to contribute positively to the long-term interest of the Movement.

In the field of disarmament, Myanmar was one of the original members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) established in 1962, and has ever since participated in the work of its successor bodies and the CD. Myanmar's firm commitment to and full support for genuine international measures aimed at effective, verifiable and non-discriminatory arms limitations and disarmament constitute one of the mainstays of its independent and active foreign policy.

In line with this policy, my country has undertaken two major international legal acts within a short time span of two months. The first legal act was the deposit by the Myanmar Government of the instrument of accession to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with the depositary Government of the United States on 2 December 1992 and the second act was the signing of the chemical weapons Convention on 14 January 1993.

Since the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly when Myanmar joined other countries in proposing a nuclear non-proliferation treaty, we have sought an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States. It was only because they remained unfulfilled that Myanmar did not become a signatory. Now that the principal nuclear-weapon States have initiated measures for the reduction of their nuclear arsenals and the reversal of the nuclear arms race under the INF and START treaties as well as on their own unilateral initiatives in pursuance of their commitment in article VI of the NPT, the barrier to Myanmar's becoming a signatory has been removed. Accordingly, Myanmar has become the 154th State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

(U Ohn Gyaw, Myanmar)

We are now just two years away from the fifth NPT review conference to be held in 1995. The review conference will be a crucial meeting at which States parties will consider and decide on the extension of the NPT beyond its expiry date in 1995. Myanmar takes the view that certain existing flaws in the present NPT regime and the security interests on non-nuclear-weapon States require a careful reassessment of mutual rights and responsibilities between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States before a decision is taken on the further extension of the NPT. In order to ensure that there exists an improved and acceptable balance between the rights and responsibilities of nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States, nuclear-weapon States on their part should take appropriate and adequate measures to accommodate the security interests of non-nuclear-weapon States on two crucial issues. These two issues are a comprehensive nuclear test ban and negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

As I have mentioned earlier, the second international legal act undertaken by my country recently was Myanmar's signing of the chemical weapons Convention at the signing ceremony in Paris on 14 January. As a country that neither possesses nor has any intention to acquire those weapons in the future, this act fully demonstrates the commitment of Myanmar to the total elimination of the scourge of those horrendous weapons. Myanmar will take an active part in the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

There is a widespread feeling among the members of the CD that the Conference should at its 1993 session direct its concentrated efforts to a few selected priority items. We share this feeling. One such priority item is agenda item 1: "Nuclear test ban". Myanmar endorses the view that an end to nuclear testing by all States in all environments for all time is an essential step in order to prevent the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons and their further proliferation. A number of significant developments have taken place in the past year in this area.

France has observed a nuclear testing moratorium during 1992. The Russian Federation has observed a nuclear testing moratorium during 1992 and has announced its decision to extend the moratorium at least until the middle of 1993. The United States has put in place a nuclear testing moratorium for nine months with effect from 1 October 1992.

At the 1992 session of the CD, the delegation of France declared its intention to participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, if the Ad Hoc Committee was re-established during the 1992 session of the CD.

It is regrettable that, despite all these positive developments, the CD found itself unable to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban at its 1992 session. We hope that the renewed interest and the renewed sense of urgency shared by many members of the CD to address this question in a substantive manner will contribute to the speedy re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban at this year's session and towards achieving significant progress in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee.

(U Ohn Gyaw, Myanmar)

The forty-seventh session of the Untied Nations General Assembly adopted on 9 December 1992 resolution 47/47 on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. My country was one of the co-sponsors, and it was passed by an overwhelming majority of affirmative votes. It is interesting to note that a nuclear-weapon State which in previous years cast negative votes abstained this year. We believe that in pursuance of the above-mentioned resolution, the CD should take a speedy decision to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban on the basis of the draft mandate reached last year as the result of consultations under the coordinatorship of Ambassador Shah of India. The Ad Hoc Committee, once it is

thus re-established, should immediately start its substantive work, addressing the issues of structure and scope and of verification and compliance.

Another priority agenda item on which the CD should concentrate its efforts at its 1993 session is effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use nuclear weapons (negative security assurances - NSA). The best guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is the total elimination of nuclear weapons from the face of the earth. Pending the realization of this goal, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures or arrangements for NSA. We firmly believe that effective measures or arrangements for NSA are an essential element in a viable and effective regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and can contribute positively to the reduction of the risks of nuclear war. The forty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 47/50 on NSA by an overwhelming majority with no opposing vote. It is now high time for the CD to take a fresh look at the question of NSA in the light of the recent positive developments on the international political scene and to make some movements forward on this important question at its 1993 session.

The question of transparency in armaments is a new item which was introduced into the agenda of the CD only last year. The consideration of this item in the CD is still in its early stages, and it requires careful study of the subject in all its aspects. I wish to stress here that transparency in armaments should be non-discriminatory, and it should cover not only conventional armaments but also armaments in nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction by countries large and small.

The year 1993 may well be a watershed for the CD. This negotiating body has to reassess its role, and review its agenda and its work. At a critical time like this, let us spare no effort to strengthen the role of the CD as the single multilateral negotiating forum dealing with disarmament, and lend it our full cooperation and support so that it may effectively respond to the needs of the changing times and may achieve further successes in the field of multilateral arms limitations and disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Myanmar for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I think I can also extend thanks in the name of

Ambassador Berasategui and of my predecessor. I now give the floor to the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control of New Zealand, the Honourable Douglas Graham.

Mr. GRAHAM (New Zealand): It is an honour for me once again to address the Conference on Disarmament at this the opening of its 1993 session. It is indeed encouraging to hear that work on substantive matters will begin soon, and I begin by thanking you, Mr. President, for your thoughtful opening remarks. I wish also to thank Mr. Berasategui, Secretary-General of the Conference, for conveying to us the message from the United Nations Secretary-General.

A few days ago in Paris I had the honour to sign, on behalf of New Zealand, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction - the CWC. Today I want to congratulate the Conference on Disarmament for its success in negotiating that Convention. It was, I know, a team effort, requiring the support of all regional groups, and CD members and non-members alike. But I would be remiss if I did not single out the efforts of Ambassador von Wagner, and the German delegation, for special commendation. Under his chairmanship, the CW Ad Hoc Committee succeeded, in a way the CD has not seen before, in fulfilling its mandate to bring those negotiations to a successful conclusion. The result is one of which we can all be rightly proud.

Conclusion of the CWC has undoubtedly been helped by the new and improved international climate. But it is worth noting that the Convention was largely negotiated during a period of threat and confrontation in world affairs. That was partly why negotiations were spread over such a long time. Although they took so long, the fact that they continued throughout the difficult years of the cold war demonstrated the determination of the international community to produce a result.

Not all countries which have worked towards a CWC, whether members or non-members of the CD, agree with every clause or article of the Convention. But that is the nature of international negotiations. We are all impelled by the desire to banish chemical weapons, but given the different concerns which inevitably exist among so many different States, a spirit of compromise and consensus has been essential. That spirit - so much in evidence in Geneva and in the General Assembly - allowed 130 countries to sign the Convention at the impressive ceremony I and a number of others in this room attended last week in Paris.

But the Conference cannot afford to rest on its laurels. Changes have occurred in the international security arena. In many cases the changes are positive, stemming from the bridging of the old East/West divide. The two most heavily armed States have made sweeping cuts to their nuclear arsenals. More are planned. Nuclear testing is being reduced and most nuclear Powers have undertaken unilateral moratoria. As direct manifestations of the cold

war are being swept away, mutual confidence and cooperation are replacing mutual deterrence as the basis for global security. Unfortunately, however, the cold war produced secondary effects, longer-term solutions to which still have to be found. It distorted normal processes of adjustment and shared development which should have enabled neighbouring ethnic groups to share in the bounty of an increasingly more prosperous world. The results of such distortions linger on. We are confronted with areas of grave tension, of which the conflict in the former Yugoslavia is among the worst. Such tension cannot be dissipated overnight, and will require political will, first and foremost on the part of those most immediately involved. But faced with such tragedies the United Nations is also establishing a new and vital role for itself in peace-making as well as peace-keeping. As events in former Yugoslavia and Somalia unfold, the United Nations will be tested and, we all hope, will not be found wanting.

We are fortunate that the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, takes such a keen personal interest in the disarmament/international security arena. In his report to the First Committee entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era" he pursued a number of themes which struck chords in New Zealand. We particularly see merit in his call for the practical integration of disarmament into the broader structure of the international peace and security agenda. This is consistent with the aim which New Zealand fully shared, and which has now been achieved, of an all-encompassing First Committee debate on these two interrelated issues. That debate, at last year's United Nations General Assembly, demonstrated clearly that the two are sides of the same coin.

New Zealand also shares the Secretary-General's view on the globalization of the arms control and disarmament process. The goal, as he says, is to extend disarmament efforts to include multilateral arrangements in a world-wide process involving all States. The CWC represents one firm step towards that goal. More must follow. New Zealand agrees with the Secretary-General that it is indeed timely to consider afresh the multilateral disarmament machinery post-cold-war. It is 14 years since United Nations members, at the first United Nations special session on disarmament, agreed on a new organizational framework for the United Nations' multilateral negotiating body. At the same session the complementary deliberative body, the United Nations Disarmament Commission, was also established in its current form.

Much has changed since 1978. New Zealand looks to the reconvened meeting of the First Committee on 8-12 March as an opportunity to reassess the United Nations, multilateral arms control and disarmament machinery, in particular the respective roles of the First Committee, the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament. We note that the aim of this meeting is to reach concrete agreed recommendations for action. We will fully support the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Elaraby of Egypt, and the Secretary-General, in that aim.

(Mr. Graham, New Zealand)

Even before this resumed United Nations General Assembly session was mooted the CD had sensibly been conducting its own, in-house, assessment of issues the Secretary-General has identified as requiring scrutiny. Under Ambassador Kamal and, most recently, your predecessor, Ambassador Servais of Belgium, extensive consultations have been ongoing for the past two years. Can I reiterate, at the outset, my delegation's gratitude for the way CD non-members have recently been included in those consultations? I am confident our views have been helpful.

I have had the opportunity to discuss with my delegation the results of Ambassador Servais' most recent consultations, as reported by him to members and non-members on 8 December last. I know he is going to report formally to this meeting shortly, and I hesitate to offer some of my own comments on these issues. But I think it would be artificial for me to refrain from talking about what I know are our principal concerns this morning. My delegation has noted with interest a general congruence of views between members and non-members on the question of the CD's agenda. A majority of both groups are prepared to see changes to the agenda. We would like to think this reflects the Secretary-General's call to see disarmament in the wider context. We were also interested to see that, on specific agenda items, priorities are largely the same.

New Zealand is gratified to see that item 1: Nuclear test ban is accorded a high priority by many delegations. Our efforts to promote a halt to nuclear testing, by all States, in all environments, for all time, are well known. So too is our belief that the CD has responsibility for negotiating a treaty to secure that objective. New Zealand has welcomed recent decisions through which most NWS have undertaken self-imposed testing moratoria. Such moratoria are useful as confidence-building measures, and are proof that nuclear-weapon States consider their security can be maintained without testing at least for the present time. We hope existing moratoria however continue, and that all nuclear-weapon States follow the example now being set by others.

But moratoria are no substitute for a multilateral treaty binding nuclear and non-nuclear States alike to forswear nuclear testing. Such a treaty is, in New Zealand's view, an essential step in order to prevent the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and their further proliferation. It would also strengthen the philosophical and the practical bases underlying global non-proliferation efforts. In this regard New Zealand's view is shared by the other 158 countries who supported resolution 47/47 at last year's General Assembly; who reaffirmed the particular responsibilities of the CD in negotiating a comprehensive test ban; and who urged the Conference to intensify substantive work on this issue in 1993. Bearing in mind that support, and noting the outcome of the recent consultations, I am hopeful that the Conference will waste no time in forging ahead with work under item 1: Nuclear test ban at this session. The international climate is now right for real progress to be made. We cannot talk of deadlines, but can we not think in terms of some sort of broad time-frame? Is it unreasonable to think that, with the very wide support I have mentioned, the resolution could be transformed into a treaty within three years?

(Mr. Graham, New Zealand)

Equally, we hope early work can begin on other issues identified by both members and non-members as priorities: transparency in armaments, negative security assurances, and outer space.

The other subject of the recent consultations has been that of CD membership. Unsurprisingly the results are less than conclusive. I say "unsurprisingly" since we are all aware that this is a complex and fundamental issue. New Zealand sees it as much more than just a matter of membership - of increasing the number of seats around the table by 4, 6 or 20. It is an issue which goes to the heart of the CD's raison d'être. What the membership issue is really about is what kind of multilateral disarmament negotiating body the international community wants, to best meet the new security challenges of the 1990s and the twenty-first century.

Past models are clearly no longer appropriate. The most recent East/West/non-aligned structure has gone through a series of expansions and indeed, in its essential character, remains with us to the present day. However, the bridging of the East/West divide has undermined the fundamental basis of that structure. This I think is accepted by all. Less clear-cut is how the CD should be restructured to reflect the current geopolitical situation better. I have to say that New Zealand does not see a limited expansion of membership as providing the most realistic or effective solution. Indeed, the recent consultations confirm that view. Establishing objective criteria for membership is, we believe, wellnigh impossible in this new multipolar world. The fact is that earlier categorizations of East/West, North/South, developed/developing no longer apply in the way they once did.

When we talk about restoring balance to the current structure, what do we mean? Political balance? Military balance? Economic balance? Geographic balance? All of these? To what extent should we also factor in one's ability to contribute, financially or technically, to the work of the Conference? And as a complement to the last question, how do we ensure that the voice is heard, as it should be heard, of the many members of the international community who do not have resources to participate in continuous negotiations?

But a more fundamental question is whether a restricted membership body best serves international interests, or the national interests of all States. We think not. We see merit in open-ended membership of the CD which, with all States able to participate fully in issues of concern to them, would provide a balance - a balance of interests in the most comprehensive sense. An open-ended body would also be consistent with the call of the Secretary-General, to which I referred earlier and which New Zealand supports, for a globalization of the disarmament process. And to those who would argue that disarmament negotiations require restricted participation I would say "look around you". For reasons of transparency and universality the trend is towards inclusiveness. In areas where national interests no less important than disarmament are at stake - for example economic (GATT) or environmental areas - all States expect to be able

to participate fully and as equals. Disarmament, one part of the international security equation, is not intrinsically different.

(Mr. Graham, New Zealand)

I noted previously that, on the question of agenda, members and non-members demonstrated a welcome congruence of views. It concerns me that no such congruence yet exists on the question of membership. Most non-members favour an open-ended Conference. Most existing members do not. It is not putting it too strongly, I believe, to suggest that the price of exclusivity for the CD in today's world may be increasing loss of touch or even ineffectiveness.

The CD works by a process of consensus. We would hope that consensus will govern the reflections that members and non-members make together about its future structure, as a prelude to the resumed First Committee debate. I appreciate that the deadline for your report to that Committee is fast approaching, Mr. President. But I am confident that all concerned are well aware of the need to demonstrate that the CD is capable of responding positively - through both its agenda and its procedures - to the requirements of the changing and more complex world of the twenty-first century.

In the wake of our chemical weapons Convention success, expectations are high. I hope that all United Nations members will support your efforts, Mr. President, to ensure that the CD finds a form in which it can continue to meet our collective aspirations. Indeed, it will have to if it is to retain its central place in the United Nations machinery as the only multilateral negotiating body. I assure you of New Zealand's assistance in meeting that challenge.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control of New Zealand for his important statement and his thoughts and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Marín Bosch.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Only a few days after the signature of the Convention on the elimination of chemical weapons in Paris, the Conference on Disarmament is resuming its work in this, its thirty-second annual session and the fifteenth in its new era. This new era began as a result of the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament in 1978 and for many years was characterized by its lack of results. Last year, however, it successfully rounded off a long and complicated process of negotiations on a subject of vital importance and in 1993 we must do everything within our power to pursue negotiations on other priority issues, beginning with a complete ban on nuclear testing. And we must begin these negotiations as soon as possible.

The commencement of each annual session of the Conference on Disarmament is important and this year more than ever. We are convinced that, under your presidency, we will do so in a prompt way. Your diplomatic experience and your

savoir-faire augur well and we are certain that, despite your other important responsibilities in Geneva, your leadership of this multilateral negotiating organ will be successful. We offer you the full cooperation of the delegation of Mexico. We thank Ambassador Michel Servais for the efforts he made at the end of our 1992 session and throughout the inter-sessional period. We extend cordial greetings to the Secretary-General

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of the Conference, Ambassador Vicente Berasategui, as well as Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail. We wish a warm welcome to our new colleagues from Germany, India, Kenya and Sweden. We wish their predecessors, Ambassadors von Wagner, Shah, Ogada and Hyltenius, as well as Ambassador de Rivero of Peru and Ambassador Králik, now of the Slovak Republic, every success in their new duties.

We listened very carefully, Sir, to the important address that you gave at the beginning of this meeting. We are also grateful for the message from the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the statements by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Myanmar and the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control of New Zealand.

The successful conclusion of our work on chemical weapons, together with the new international situation, beginning with the end of the cold war and including the change at the helm of the United Nations, obliges us to give serious thought to the future of the disarmament machinery in the United Nations system in general and this Conference in particular. Ironically, our task has acquired a degree of urgency to a great extent because of the interest that has been displayed by the new Secretary-General, Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in some of the activities of the Organization. In particular he has laid emphasis on peacekeeping operations, which had been set aside because of the differences of approach between the two main military alliances. All this has changed and a new course is being plotted for the Organization. This has been made very clear as a result of the report entitled "An agenda for peace" that the Secretary-General himself prepared at the request of the summit meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, as well as his report entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era" (A/C.1/47/7, now reproduced as Conference document CD/1176).

Thirty years ago, when the then ENDC was established, the two main goals of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament were laid down: nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. These goals were reiterated by all, I repeat all, the Member States of the United Nations at the special session that the General Assembly dedicated to disarmament in 1978. At that time the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat was strengthened, giving it greater autonomy within the Division of Political and Security Council Affairs, and a broad agreement was reached on the varied range of questions on disarmament, an agreement that was recorded in the form of the final document of that first special session on disarmament.

It is obvious that the new international circumstances require that the United Nations should act very differently from the way we became accustomed to during the cold war. But it is also obvious that any change in the elements agreed in 1978 calls for an equally unanimous decision of the Members of the United Nation. We cannot, for the sake of alleged pragmatism, distort the agreements that have already been reached in this area. It is true that pragmatism does not appear among the principles that have been enshrined in the United Nations Charter, nor can one demand ever greater participation by the United Nations in solving political and military problems and at the same

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time cut down the Department for Disarmament Affairs. Indeed, as recent experience in various countries of the now extinct Warsaw Pact has shown, the implementation of disarmament agreements is no easy task and requires the assistance of experts as well as funds. What would be ideal, of course, would be to convene a new special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. However, the preparatory work for such a session could be lengthy and present requirements do not allow collective decisions to be deferred for too long. Hence it has been decided that the work of the First Committee of the General Assembly should resume for a week next March. Hence, too, both the Member States of the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament have been requested to submit our views on the ideas set out by the Secretary-General in the document in question to the First Committee for its consideration. This is an important task that we will have to discharge with some speed.

The Conference on Disarmament will have to pursue the consultations that we have been carrying out under the effective guidance of Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan on our methods of work, including the expansion of its membership and the participation of observers. In past times issues of this type were resolved by the delegations of the two countries that provided the co-Chairmen of the Conference until 1978. Since then it has been the General Assembly that has dealt with these aspects. In 1978, the President of the Assembly was entrusted with the task of securing an agreement on the membership of the future Conference on Disarmament. And in addition to the five nuclear-weapon States - whose inclusion had already been agreed on - it was decided to keep the then members of the CCD, adding just a few other new countries out of the many that had expressed an interest in joining the Conference. The membership was based on the now obsolete criteria of the political and military balance of the cold war. Those who were not able to join then were promised that there would be a periodic review of the membership of the CD. Well, we have now been discussing the possible expansion of the Conference for quite some time. But the formula agreed some years ago, as we were reminded by the distinguished Minister from New Zealand a few moments ago, is based on those very same cold war criteria, criteria which, as the recent Security Council decisions and the General Assembly resolutions show, have become invalid. Hence the time has perhaps come for a thorough review of the membership of this negotiating body. And we must ask the question: who should carry out a review. Ourselves or the General Assembly?

Pending agreement on the membership and/or the expansion of the CD we should take one or two decisions on the participation of observers with a view to making this exercise automatic and facilitating access by them to the various subsidiary bodies and informal meetings. We would thus avoid awkward situations for all but especially for observers, as might perhaps occur later on this morning.

Another question that we would like the President of the Conference to study in informal consultations is that of the content of our agenda. Here too we should act with a degree of caution. It is not a matter of throwing out our present agenda without having first reached general agreement on the subjects that should appear in the new one. But even more important for the future of this Conference is that we should start immediately, and without

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prejudice to our formal agenda, the substantive consideration of certain items in order to give tangible proof of our usefulness as a multilateral negotiating body on disarmament. One way of attaining this would be to establish ad hoc committees on each of various subjects that we have already identified together. This could be done without the need for prolonged discussions on their mandates - a practice which we have followed in the past, but which has certainly not produced the hoped-for results.

For my delegation the subject of the complete prohibition of nuclear testing is of crucial importance. One hundred and fifty nine countries voted in favour of resolution 47/47 which the General Assembly adopted on this subject. My delegation had the honour to introduce this resolution on behalf of 100 or so co-sponsors. The resolution had just 4 abstentions and one single vote against. Changes are approaching in some governments and we should take advantage of the voluntary or de facto moratoriums in the testing programmes of four of the five nuclear-weapon States. The industrial-military complexes have apparently begun to shrink. The case of the scientists dealing with nuclear testing is one example of this. Resuming nuclear testing would mean reversing this trend. At the same time, the situation that is prevailing at present in certain nuclear-weapon States is conducive to a total ban on nuclear testing. Nevertheless, no one can guarantee that the groups that are still advocating the continuation of the nuclear arms race will not regain decisive influence in the future.

The issue of the complete cessation of nuclear testing should also be viewed in the broader context of nuclear disarmament. Here we will just indicate two aspects: firstly, just a few weeks ago the Presidents of the United States and Russia signed the START II agreement, which, if it is fully implemented, will constitute a historic step towards nuclear disarmament. Mexico has advocated the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction through the conclusion of international legal instruments. And the codification of international law in this area should be pursued with renewed energy. The elimination of chemical weapons, as with the ban on biological weapons 20 years ago, should be seen as part of a process that will end only when we also eliminate nuclear weapons. Until then, there will continue to be an unacceptable situation, since there are

countries that have renounced the possession of nuclear weapons while others continue to develop them and in the case of still others we do not know for certain whether they have them or not. We are also concerned that, while attempts are being made to bring about drastic reductions in nuclear stockpiles, new doctrines are arising such as the doctrine of minimal nuclear deterrence, which could not only be an indication of a determination to continue maintaining a nuclear monopoly, but also points to the stagnant and sometimes confused thinking of the so-called strategist of the cold war.

Secondly, we should recall that in a few months' time the preparatory process for the 1995 NPT review and extension conference will begin. Proper preparations for this conference will require a detailed discussion of the substantive aspects of the issue of nuclear proliferation, which cannot be postponed until the conference itself is held, as has occurred on previous

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occasions. Indeed, this discussion, which will cover subjects that are examined here and in Vienna, should involve the participation of all countries, whether or not they are parties to the NPT.

At the suggestion of my delegation, the members of the CD have been examining in informal meetings the varied range of aspects relating to non-proliferation in general. We think that these consultations should go on with a view to identifying an aspect or aspects of non-proliferation which could benefit from more formal treatment by the CD. Although in the nuclear area marked progress has been made in recent months, we are concerned that transfers of or trade in conventional weapons have grown in alarming proportions over the last 12 months. In particular we are surprised that the purchasers of such weapons now include countries that we did not think were involved in military rivalry. The role played in this area by the five permanent members of the Security Council, which are involved in about 80 per cent of these dealings, should be examined, as was stated a few days ago by my country's Secretary of External Relations, both from the practical and from the moral point of view, given their position and the powers that they enjoy within the Council itself.

To conclude, allow me to emphasize the need for us to commence our substantive work as soon as possible, while at the same time endeavouring to introduce modifications and innovations in our methods of work which will not mark a break with the CD's past but will enable it to change.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): Thank you, Ambassador Marín Bosch. I thank the representative of Mexico for his important statement and the very kind words addressed to me.

(continued in English)

I now give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador Wagenmakers.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands): It is certainly a special occasion to address the Conference on Disarmament at its first plenary meeting of the annual session. The importance of our resumed session is brought out by the two ministerial addresses we have just heard. It is with great pleasure that I congratulate you, Sir, on your taking up your responsibilities as the first President of the Conference on Disarmament in the 1993 session. We are confident that your leadership and skill will enable the Conference on Disarmament to meet the important challenges which it faces in the coming months. I pledge to you my full support in your conduct of the Conference's business. Allow me to express my deep appreciation and respect to your predecessor, Ambassador Michel Servais of Belgium, for his contribution during a long and demanding presidency in which he so competently carried out his "mission impossible". May I avail myself of this opportunity to say a sincere farewell to a number of esteemed colleagues who have recently taken up other duties? - H.E. Roberto García Moritán of Argentina, H.E. Dr. Juraj Králik of Czechoslovakia, H.E. Dr. Adolf Ritter von Wagner of Germany, H.E. Prakash Shah

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of India, H.E. Andrea Negrotto Cambiaso of Italy, H.E. Prof. Thomas Ariba Ogada of Kenya and H.E. Carl Magnus Hyltenius of Sweden. I wish them every success in their new endeavours. At the same time, please allow me to welcome my new colleagues who have recently taken up their post at the Conference on Disarmament: H.E. M. Juan Archibaldo Lanús of Argentina, H.E. Dr. Wolfgang Hoffmann of Germany, H.E. Satish Chandra of India, H.E. Dr. Don Nanjira of Kenya and H.E. Lars Norberg of Sweden.

The cold war is over, the end of bloc-to-bloc confrontation leaves us with an in some aspects safer, but immensely more complicated and unstable international situation. Safer, because arms control and disarmament is an everyday reality. The new and unprecedented Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) between the United States and the Russian Federation will eliminate the most destabilizing strategic nuclear weapons. The international community is tackling the issue of conventional armaments. There are agreements in this respect concerning the European region. Other regions show similar initiatives. Worldwide there is now in place the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. In the Conference on Disarmament we have engaged in the exercise of transparency in armaments.

None the less, I also used the term "unstable" a moment ago to describe the present international situation. Why? Because the world is changing fast. There is a great risk that the changes occurring now may outpace our thinking and processes of adaptation, creating risks instead of stability, confusion where there should be clarity. The recent proliferation of regional and ethnic conflicts is a sad example that even if one type of security has improved, security in specific areas is not necessarily better. This was dramatically shown by the Gulf conflict. It is still apparent in the problems in the former Yugoslavia, the situation in Angola, Cambodia and Somalia. Unfortunately, there are many more "hot spots" in the world. In short, the international community is

faced with profound new challenges in the search for peace. As you observed in your opening statement, Mr. President, "history has accelerated its pace".

Change is now coming inevitably also to the Conference on Disarmament. This might seem strange. Hasn't the Geneva arms control and disarmament community over the years reached quite remarkable achievements? The latest of these successes is certainly not the least. The chemical weapons Convention is a shining example of what the Conference on Disarmament has been able to achieve, when the necessary political will was there. Let me at this point take the opportunity of warmly thanking the President of France and the French Government for their hosting of the chemical weapons Convention signing ceremony and for their hospitality. It is a remarkable accomplishment that no less than 130 States signed the Convention last week and adopted, without a vote, a resolution establishing the Preparatory Commission. The Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, Kooijmans, stated last week on the occasion of the chemical weapons Convention signing ceremony: "Many States and many individuals have contributed to this outstanding success. Let me just single out two countries which have played a special role in the past

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year: Australia by preparing a new, clean text for the Convention and Germany, whose Ambassador von Wagner skilfully steered the end-product to its conclusion".

We live in a time of dramatic changes; it is about change that I would like to speak today. I will discuss, starting from a brief historical perspective, the changing environment in which the Conference on Disarmament operates, the security requirements of the 1990s; then, what I would like to call "the parameters of change"; and finally the future direction the Conference on Disarmament should take and the ensuing consequences for its working agenda and composition.

First let us briefly focus on the past. If we look at the Conference on Disarmament and its predecessors in a historical perspective, we must recognize that the Conference on Disarmament has contributed to the achievement of treaties that have to a large extent resulted in a legal framework, banning three types of weapons of mass destruction. The main criticism that I have heard in the past is that it took too much time. That may have been true, but treaties which are related to the security of States are inherently difficult to negotiate. Again, the chemical weapons Convention is illustrative in this respect, both as to the intensity of negotiations, the novelty of the subjects it deals with as well as of its thorough verification provisions, and the time consumed to complete it. Success depends on breakthroughs in political thinking and these sometimes happen only after prolonged periods of adaptation to new ideas, or of getting rid of old ones.

If the Conference on Disarmament has been successful, then why change it? Isn't there an old saying: if it ain't broke, don't fix it! I believe that yes, the Conference on Disarmament must change, and it must do so urgently.

If the Conference on Disarmament is sometimes considered a product of the cold war, so too are some of the subjects it negotiates about, its negotiating style and its results. In a sense, the Conference on Disarmament has almost reached the end of the road indicated in 1948 by the Security Council Commission for Conventional Armaments. I say almost, because if we accept the notion that we have negotiated about subjects and weapons which were directly relevant under the parameters of the cold war and defined in the 1978 special session on disarmament, then we must also accept that, even if the cold war is over, our negotiations are not yet entirely complete.

In the old style, there remains work to be done on nuclear testing in order to arrive at a nuclear test ban; we might eventually be implicated in, for example, work concerning the negotiation of verification provisions for the biological and toxin weapons Convention. If we abide by the definition of weapons of mass destruction drawn up by the Security Council Commission for Conventional Armaments, we might continue our efforts to reach agreement on the long-deadlocked issues concerning radiological weapons. And, of course, there we are already confronted with an element of change. We, in our delegation, have invariably taken a dim view of the American-Soviet proposal for the establishment of a convention banning radiological weapons alone, non-existent weapons. However, if this trite subject is dynamized into also

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covering a prohibition of attacks on certain nuclear facilities, we are all for it. In the wake of the persistent damage caused by the Chernobyl accident, we continue to believe that it is a foremost duty of the Conference on Disarmament to establish such a ban.

If we are to understand why the Conference on Disarmament must change, we must look at the future and at the security requirements of the 1990s. Our attempts to do so up to now have shown us that this is not an easy task. Your predecessor Ambassador de Azambuja of Brazil realized that when he urged us on 8 February 1990 to break out of our bewilderment and react purposefully to the new international situation. We can take our cue from other institutions which have preceded us. The United Nations Security Council in its summit declaration of January last year indicated what it considered to be threats to international peace and security and stated what steps to take to eliminate them, turning the logic of non-proliferation into concerted action. The United Nations Secretary-General in his report "An agenda for peace" focused on diverse and often contradictory trends that have contributed to new threats to international security. In his report "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era", the United Nations Secretary-General looked for concepts as well as ways and means to achieve an integrated approach to arms regulation and disarmament. He observed: "The world has become a little safer, but considerably more complicated. The changed international environment has created new opportunities for the pursuit of disarmament, as well as posing new challenges". The General Assembly has recommended immediate practical steps in the direction of enhanced security through greater transparency in armaments. At

the same time it drew up a road map to achieve even broader objectives. Shaping a new, cooperative security environment in which agreed confidence-building measures effectively prevent destabilizing and excessive accumulation of arms; in which scarce resources are freed for socio-economic development of nations.

It is not at all too late for us to adapt too. Not too late, but it is time we did so now, since the world is in a state of flux and full of uncertainties which make it difficult for States to assess and provide for their legitimate security requirements. Cold peace should not replace cold war. We in the Conference on Disarmament should heed those messages without fear for our cherished independence from other bodies. If we don't, we risk losing more than our political relevance and our independence!

Mr. President, allow me to expand on what my Government sees as a future for the Conference on Disarmament, both in terms of substance of work and of its institutional aspects. The main reason why the Conference on Disarmament has to adapt is the end of the cold war and the bipolar world. At the same time this indicates the direction that we have to take. I suggest we think in terms of parameters of change. I am basically trying to aim at some fixed points in time and space, from which we can draw tangible inspiration for our changing work.

The bipolar character of our political diversity of the past, and the role of weapons of mass destruction therein, inevitably led to an emphasis in negotiations on those weapon systems which could upset a fragile bipolar

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equilibrium. The style of our global disarmament negotiating forum evolved correspondingly. Our "Decalogue" is a reflection of that period and of those circumstances. Its predecessor bodies and the Conference on Disarmament between them have had on the basis of their multilateral agenda an astonishing success: a web of interlocking treaties concerning the most horrendous weapons is now in place. We should all recognize that and be grateful for it.

It is precisely the Conference on Disarmament's very success that should not make us shy away from the recognition that the relative importance of the Conference on Disarmament's negotiations and consultations in its present form is diminishing, because we now face different dangers and different challenges to international peace and security. The United Nations Secretary-General observed in his report "New dimensions": "Traditionally, disarmament has been perceived as a relatively distinct subject which required its own separate organizational framework. We now need to realize that disarmament constitutes an integral part of international efforts to strengthen international peace and security. Problems in this field can be resolved only in conjunction with other political and economic issues, while solutions to political and economic issues are often found in conjunction with disarmament measures". If we want to think of a Conference on Disarmament in a new style - and my Government fervently believes that there is a need for it - then we must also look at the dangers to

international peace and security, only too real, that we face now and are likely to face in the future, not at those that we faced in the past.

I believe that the main danger in the past came from the possession of destabilizing numbers of weapons and the real threat of surprise attacks. That possession led to the need to regularize and subsequently reduce and/or eliminate those weapons. True, the bipolarity of the world then, at the same time, imposed a certain measure of discipline: no regional conflict was allowed to grow into a super-Power confrontation. Ironically, if not tragically, this has also led to many underlying reasons for regional disputes remaining unresolved. Regional conflicts have now mushroomed, fed by fierce assertions of nationalism and by ethnic and religious strife or simply because dictatorships continue their often brutal struggle for hegemony, this time unfed, but also unchecked, by the rivalry of major Powers. It is against this background that, gradually, the international community has come to the conclusion that the main danger of today is the acquisition and accumulation of destabilizing quantities of weapons in excess of legitimate defence requirements and that the central priority of the international security cooperation is or should be the prevention of armed conflict.

The parameters of change impose on us, however, not just the necessity to take on new subjects on our disarmament agenda, but, ideally, to change the Conference on Disarmament's basically bipolar structure into a truly multilateral one, with an agenda which is the reflection not only of a multilateral consensus but also of real multilateral interests. The Conference on Disarmament has a great opportunity to become a modern organization again in the 1990s by adapting: now, in the wake of the success of multilateral disarmament, the latest expression of which is the chemical

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weapons Convention, but also before the marker point of the 1990s, the crucial calibration date of 1995: the review and extension conference of the non-proliferation Treaty.

Oddly, there is an example in the bilateral sphere in the Lisbon Protocol: the START Treaty, once purely bilateral, has become dependent for its success on multinational implementation of a number of its provisions. Perhaps I may, at this point, take the opportunity to congratulate wholeheartedly the distinguished representatives of the United States of America and the Russian Federation for the outstanding achievements which culminated in the signing of the START II treaty at the Moscow summit on 3 January of this year.

Having defined the parameters of change and the evolving security environment, we can set ourselves a number of criteria for our own process of taking decisions. First, it is clear that the Conference on Disarmament must become a truly multilateral organization, not a relic from the cold war, and that this must be reflected in its working agenda and its membership. Secondly, there

must be continuity of purpose: the Conference on Disarmament should remain primarily an independent negotiating body. At the same time it should stay in close touch with the world outside.

The present agenda and membership of the Conference on Disarmament reflect the bipolarity of the old world order. It is therefore not surprising that looking at the agenda, one finds that it bears little relevance to the situation and the realities of the present day. The agenda is a direct result of the special session on disarmament of 1978. That session has had great significance for our work. We should of course also realize that much of its nuclear component was eventually dealt with outside the framework of the Conference on Disarmament. Disarmament is an internationally practised day-to-day reality now, no matter where the Conference on Disarmament stands. Our work on the present agenda of the Conference on Disarmament is not yet entirely finished, but the present-day irrelevance of some of its subjects should lead us to take a closer view at the agenda as a whole.

It might be useful for example to integrate the nuclear issues into one nuclear item: under such an item, we might set up an Ad Hoc Committee or working groups on sub-items, the membership of which could vary and would reflect the interest of the respective members of the international community. Nuclear testing remains of course a priority issue which justifies the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee without further delay.

Another priority item would be non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and restrictions on conventional weapons. Taking up this subject in its broader context, at the same time dealing with its various specific issues of concern, would show that the Conference on Disarmament is capable of reacting, not only to the many signals and messages from other organizations and institutions, but also to concrete political and military events and developments in specific areas. It is the acquisition of the means of defence that must become transparent: reciprocal provision between States of accurate data on national holdings of conventional weapons has the potential of

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building confidence and of assisting identification of cases of excessive build-up. Despite the biological weapons Convention and despite the chemical weapons Convention, efforts to acquire those weapons of mass destruction or the means to manufacture them continue unabated. Ipso facto, the same applies to nuclear weapons. Is nuclear multipolarity going to be our future? Some of the States that do a lot of talking on the necessity of nuclear non-proliferation seem themselves engaged in efforts to acquire such weapons. In a number of cases, this trend has had a direct negative bearing on part of our work in the Conference on Disarmament.

Strangely, there is both a similarity and an important difference in the consequences of proliferation and the effects of bipolarity on regional issues: bipolarity and proliferation both can lead to a regional dispute escalating out

of control; both also have the tragic effect of masking the real underlying reasons that led to the regional dispute in the first place, thus creating new "truths" or new "faits accomplis". The difference however, is that, in the case of bipolarity as the main actor, there can also be a restraining influence. In the case of proliferation as the prime mover there is none; on the contrary, it leads to an inflated belief in one's own power, to irresponsible behaviour, and it thus has the potential to endanger international peace and security beyond one's own region. It is in this spirit that we should take a hard look at previous agenda items that should remain - I mentioned earlier the undiminished necessity of outlawing attacks on certain nuclear facilities - and at new agenda items likely to lead to agreements on effective reduction and limitation of armaments. I can think of elaboration of the concept of reasonable defence sufficiency. This would match the United Nations Secretary-General's proposal to establish regional agreements on what constitutes clearly excessive or threatening conventional military capabilities.

Our efforts with respect to non-proliferation should be intensified and go hand in hand with the work the Conference on Disarmament has already embarked on, namely concerning transparency in armaments and conventional disarmament. With the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms now in place both subjects complement each other, in their purpose and in their approach. It is a task where the Conference on Disarmament is still in its infancy. It is important because of the possible future expansion of the Register, a task we will face in the United Nations in 1994, but also because of its correlation with another subject which the Conference on Disarmament might take on: regional issues. The Conference on Disarmament is a body that engages in consultations and negotiations on a global scale. However, if the purview of the activities of the Conference on Disarmament remains strictly global, it might soon risk becoming sterile. It is the regional disputes that allow their impulses to become threats to international peace and security. International transfers of conventional arms beyond legitimate defence needs, particularly to regions of tension, increase the dangers of conflict and hinder the achievement of peaceful settlement of disputes. In connection with efforts aimed at achieving confidence-building measures, the Conference on Disarmament might provide expertise for consultations and negotiations on specific guidelines, adapted for specific circumstances if the need for that is felt and if the political opportunity to do so presents itself.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

To become truly multilateral, we must change the composition of the Conference on Disarmament. The present membership of the Conference on Disarmament still reflects the bipolarity of the cold war. We must be careful not to fall into the trap of making the CD a body where North-South membership becomes an issue or, worse, predominates. The criterion for expansion should not be more for one group and only so many for the other. The new composition of the Conference should, on the contrary, follow the imperative of the parameters for change, that is, it should accommodate those States which can and are prepared to make a substantial contribution to furthering our agenda for international peace

and cooperative security in the future. One should take into account for example the subjects which should become our priority items from now on. Certainly, all States that have shown an interest up to now and that have already applied for membership should be allowed to become members of the Conference on Disarmament sooner rather than later. It is a decision that need not take much time and effort. Let us do it fast.

A prerequisite for negotiations on security issues is the need for consensus. It is only through the rule of consensus that negotiations can become meaningful and take shape. There is no future for the Conference on Disarmament if we abandon that rule. Consensus can act as a stimulus, but also as a brake. It should not scare us. Many concepts of disarmament need time to take shape. The independence of the CD should of course be maintained, but independence does not mean that the CD should not re-evaluate its role in the system of interlocking institutions dealing with arms control and disarmament.

There is a parallel with a different organization, the North Atlantic Alliance, of which my country is a member. Its core function is and will remain to secure the freedom and security of its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. This objective remains unchanged. But without giving up its independence, the Alliance is now, since the decision in Oslo in June 1992, engaged in support for peace-keeping in the framework of the efforts of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Alliance is now also prepared to support, on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with its own procedures, peace-keeping operations under the authority of the United Nations Security Council. Contacts with the Secretary-General of the United Nations are maintained regarding the assistance that the Alliance could provide. The Alliance as well as individual members are now contributing to the implementation of some United Nations Security Council resolutions and it is, for the first time in its history, taking part in United Nations peace-keeping and sanctions enforcement operations. None of these activities has in any way affected the Alliance's independence.

Faced with new demands and challenges the Alliance has therefore accepted a new role within Europe. Without reducing its core tasks the Conference on Disarmament could do likewise in the field where it has the necessary competence and expertise, that is in disarmament. By contributing such

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expertise and efforts on specific disarmament components of international agreements, the work of the CD could become more relevant and better integrated into international efforts concerning the promotion of international peace and security. This certainly does not imply that we should try to duplicate work which is being done in the framework of the CSCE and some other regional organizations. The delegations assembled here would certainly not be in favour

of copying work being done elsewhere. However, what we could try is to be more outward-looking by exploring the possibilities of offering the expertise of the CD in areas we have been dealing with to those groups of States that in a regional setting are willing to embark on the road to disarmament. That too was, if I am not mistaken, one of the central points in the message to the CD of the Secretary-General of the United Nations which was read out to us a moment ago. I believe that we should heed it.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Netherlands for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me, as well as the references made to my predecessor, Ambassador de Azambuja. I think this would also be an appropriate time to express the thanks of Brazil to the Government of the Netherlands for offering the hospitable city of The Hague as the seat of the CW Organization. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Mr. President, first of all I would like to congratulate you upon your assumption of the presidency as we open our 1993 session. You will have my full support and that of my delegation as you undertake the difficult task of setting up our working arrangements for the year. I would also like to extend a warm welcome to our new CD colleagues who have arrived in Geneva since we last met in 1992.

I am taking the floor on this, our opening session for 1993, on behalf of the delegations of the United States and Russia to announce formally the signature on 3 January 1993 by President Bush and President Yeltsin of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The Treaty, often called START Two, will codify the Joint Understanding signed by the two Presidents at the Washington summit on 17 June 1992. It will reduce dramatically the total number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by both countries by two thirds below current levels, and it will require the elimination of the most destabilizing class of strategic weapons - all multiple-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles or MIRVed ICBM. The Treaty also includes a Protocol on elimination or conversion concerning heavy ICBM and heavy ICBMs silos, a Protocol on exhibition and inspection concerning heavy bombers, and a Memorandum on attribution.

The new Treaty builds upon the START Treaty signed on 31 July 1991 between the United States and the Soviet Union, but will call for far greater reductions in strategic nuclear forces. All START One provisions will pertain, except as explicitly modified in the new Treaty. Because of the close relationship between the two treaties, START Two may not enter into force before START One. It - that is, START Two - shall also remain in force throughout the duration of START One.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

The Treaty will set equal ceilings on the number of strategic nuclear weapons that can be deployed by either side. Reductions will be carried out in

two phases. The first phase will be completed seven years after entry into force of the START One Treaty. The second phase will be completed no later than the year 2003. By the end of the first phase, each side must have reduced its total deployed strategic nuclear warheads to between 3,800 and 4,250. Those include the number of warheads on deployed ICBMs, heavy ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Of the total of 3,800-4,250 warheads, no more than 1,200 may be on deployed MIRVed ICBMs, no more than 2,160 may be on deployed SLBMs, and no more than 650 may be on deployed heavy ICBMs. Under START Two, weapons on heavy bombers with nuclear missions will be counted using the number of such weapons (for example, bombs and air-launched cruise missiles) for which they are actually equipped, listed by each side in the Memorandum of attribution. The new bomber-counting rule constitutes a major change from START One, under which a heavy bomber actually equipped to carry as much as 20 nuclear weapons counted as only 1 unit against the Treaty ceilings. The new bomber-counting rule is a significant step forward by Russia and the United States, reflecting the partnership and trust between our two nations.

By the end of the second and final phase, each side must have reduced its total deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,000-3,500. Of those, none may be on MIRVed ICBs, including heavy ICBMs. Thus, all MIRVed ICBMs must be eliminated from each side's deployed forces; only ICBs carrying a single warhead will be allowed. No more than 1,700-1,750 deployed warheads may be on SLBMs. Although START Two contains no specific prohibition on MIRVed SLBMs, the number of warheads on these missiles will be dramatically reduced as well.

The START Two Treaty will allow for a reduction in the number of warheads on certain ballistic missiles. Such "downloading" will be permitted in a carefully structured fashion, modifying the counting rules agreed in START One. The Treaty also calls for the elimination of all deployed and non-deployed heavy ICBMs by no later than 1 January 2003, either in accordance with START Two procedures or by using them for space launch purposes. In addition, the Treaty places further limits and restrictions on heavy bombers.

The comprehensive START verification regime will apply to the new Treaty. In addition, START Two will include some new verification measures, such as on-site observation of SS-18 silo conversion and missile elimination procedures, exhibitions and inspections of all heavy bombers to confirm nuclear weapon loads, and exhibitions of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role to confirm their observable differences. Under the terms of START Two, the costs of certain types of verification will be borne by the inspecting party.

On 25 December 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist and the commonwealth of independent States was established. Four independent States with strategic nuclear weapons on their territory also came into existence - Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine. These four newly independent States and the United States reached agreement on 23 May 1992 in Lisbon, Portugal on

how they would all adhere to the START Treaty. The agreement was codified in a new protocol to START that makes all five States parties to the Treaty. Under the terms of the protocol, the four newly independent States will make the necessary implementing arrangements among themselves to carry out their responsibilities under START. In addition, in legally binding letters, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus also committed to eliminate all nuclear weapons and all strategic offensive arms from their territories within the seven-year START reduction period. They have also made a commitment to join the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear-weapon States.

As I mentioned earlier, because of the close relationship between the START Two Treaty and the START Treaty or START One, START Two may not enter into force before the START Treaty. The United States Congress and the parliaments of the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan have already consented to START ratification. We look to early similar action by the Parliaments of Ukraine and Belarus. We attach equal importance to the speedy accession of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States. To give further emphasis to this last point, the Russian Federation has taken the position that without such action on the part of the three States, neither START One nor START Two may enter into force.

Mr. President, Ambassador Batsanov and I are submitting to you today the Russian- and English-language versions of the text of the START Two Treaty, with its attachments, for circulation as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament. I think that you and the members will find these documents to be relevant to the substance of the work of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Ledogar for his statement and for the formal announcement made in the name of his own country and that of the Russian Federation concerning the important Treaty signed between these two countries and for the information given on its provisions. I indeed received already the communication referred to by Ambassador Ledogar and, together with the secretariat, I am taking the necessary steps for the circulation of this important document. I also wish to thank Ambassador Ledogar for the kind words addressed to the Chair.

I now have the pleasure of giving the floor to the representative of Belgium, Ambassador Servais, who will submit the report which the Conference requested from him on the important questions of the agenda and membership of the Conference.

Mr. SERVAIS (Belgium) (translated from French): First of all, I should like to thank all those who, in their earlier statements, commented on the mission on which I will have the honour to report and I particularly appreciated the thanks and complementary remarks that were addressed to me.

In pursuance of the decision taken by the Conference in paragraph 18, subparagraph (f) of its annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations, I was entrusted, in my capacity as President of the

(Mr. Servais, Belgium)

Conference during the inter-sessional period, with the task of conducting consultations on two issues which the Conference considered important, namely, the agenda and membership of the Conference. During these consultations I benefited from your invaluable assistance as incoming President, as well as that of the Secretary-General of the Conference, as stipulated in the decision set out in the report. As you are aware, I invited the members of the Conference as well as the non-members that participated in our work during the year 1992 and have applied for membership to a series of bilateral consultations and small group meetings to solicit their views on these issues. I am very grateful to all those who participated in these consultations, during which new ideas and opinions were addressed in what I would call a positive climate of mutual cooperation. At the end of this series of consultations, which I also continued in New York during the deliberations of the First Committee, I invited the members and non-members to which I have just referred to open-ended consultations during which I made a statement on the results of our work during the inter-sessional period. That statement was distributed to all participants, and on that occasion the secretariat also distributed an informal paper on the membership of the multilateral disarmament negotiating body. After these consultations, which, I would remind you, were held on 8 December last, I continued to consult some members of the Conference who wished for further talks in order to respond to my questions on which they had been awaiting Government instructions. Other participants approached me to clarify certain points which had not been clarified during the first part of the consultations.

As the 1993 annual session begins I am reporting to you today on these matters as I was asked to do in accordance with the decision of the Conference. The important point that I would like to underscore is that the consultations I conducted after the meetings of 8 December 1992 did not alter the conclusions I had reached in my statement delivered on that day. Consequently, that statement of 8 December 1992 sets out my report on the duties entrusted to me by the Conference, and I commend it to the attention of the Conference.

As I complete my mission, I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for the cooperation that I received from you and all my colleagues during those consultations. Of course, I must not overlook the indispensable role played throughout this process by our Secretary-General and his entire team. I thank them all for their devotion and their enlightened guidance. I would also like to thank all the people behind the scenes, the translators, interpreters, secretaries, in a word, all those whom we never see but without whom our work could not be realized. Hearty and rousing thanks to them all. I welcome in our midst our new colleagues from Germany, Kenya and Sweden, and wish them every success in their new duties. Lastly, I wish all my colleagues an excellent year in 1993. To you, Mr. President, I wish courage, serenity and

(Mr. Servais, Belgium)

perseverance in your difficult task of revitalizing the machinery of the Conference on Disarmament at the beginning of this year. I assure you of my support and full cooperation.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Servais for his statement and his kind words addressed to me and also his good wishes.

(continued in English)

On behalf of the Conference I extend to him our appreciation for his untiring efforts in the consultations conducted during the intercessional period. As I already announced during informal consultations, it is my intention to appoint two special co-ordinators to deal with important questions which were the subject of Ambassador Servais' consultations.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor at this stage? I see the representative of Germany. Ambassador Hoffmann, you have the floor.

Mr. HOFFMANN (Germany): Mr. President, I would just like to thank you, and through you my colleagues, for their friendly words of welcome. I would like to congratulate you on your new task and I would like to add my pledges to your pledges - pledges for full co-operation and mutual support. You have not made my task much easier by mentioning the words of my previous Foreign Minister, and neither have my colleagues by mentioning the excellent work of my predecessor, because I will have to live up to their words and deeds, but I will do my level best.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Ambassador Hoffmann. You can be sure that our references are not innocent. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I give the floor to Ambassador Norberg of Sweden.

Mr. NORBERG (Sweden): I would also like to express my sincere thanks for the words of welcome extended to me by you Mr. President, and other colleagues in this Conference. When I entered this room this morning, I felt like coming back home because I used to work here for a number of years and I used to say that those were the most rewarding and interesting years in the Foreign Service. So it is with great expectation that I take up my new position here and I pledge my full cooperation with you and other colleagues of this Conference.

The PRESIDENT: If no-one else wishes to take the floor, I would recall that at the beginning of this plenary meeting I announced that I would convene an informal meeting of the Conference to consider a number of organizational questions. Although maybe we have little time until we break for lunch, I think it would be useful to start consideration of these questions, and it is my

intention to proceed in that way. In that connection, I also recall that during the intercessional period, the members of the Conference consulted on the question of enhancing the participation of non-members in our work, and there was consensus that we should seek that. Pending any decision on these

(The President)

important questions, I hope that members will agree with me that we may invite the non-members present in the conference room to stay during the informal meeting that will take place immediately. If I see no objection - and I see none - we shall proceed accordingly.

I suspend, therefore, this formal meeting of the CD and go on to an informal meeting to consider our organization matters.

The informal and the plenary meetings were adjourned at 1.10 p.m.

CD/PV.637
21 January 1993

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 21 January 1993, at 12.20 p.m.

President: Mr. Celso Luiz Nunes Amorim (Brazil)

GE.93-60127 (E)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 637th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

I shall now turn to requests from non-members to participate in the work of the Conference. Since, so far those requests seem to be acceptable, I hope that we can dispense today with convening an informal meeting to review them. This has been done by the Conference on previous occasions, when no opposition was signified to any of the requests. If I hear no comments, and without in any way setting a precedent for other cases when an informal meeting might be necessary, we will start our consideration of the draft decision circulated by the secretariat in document CD/WP.438 on the participation of non-members in the Conference. I understand the document was already circulated and if I hear no objections, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I wish also to inform you that other requests for participation received from non-members are being circulated and will be put for decision at our next plenary meeting on Tuesday, 26 January.

In connection with the decision that we have just taken, I wish to recall the statement made by my predecessor at the 603rd plenary meeting on 22 August 1991 on seating arrangements for non-member participants in our work:

> "As regards seating arrangements, non-member participants shall be seated in meetings following the English alphabetical list, beginning with the non-member whose name will be drawn by lot by the President immediately after the initial decision is taken by the Conference at the beginning of the year on requests for participation, and rotate at the same time as the Conference."

I shall proceed to do so after adjournment of this plenary meeting, with the assistance of the secretariat.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representative of Turkey, Mr. Arar, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. ARAR (Turkey) (translated from French): Mr. President, allow me first of all to congratulate you upon your election to the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I am convinced that at a time when this Conference is on the threshold of initiating an important reform, your diplomatic skills and personal qualities will make an effective contribution to this difficult endeavour.

I have taken the floor to express the views of my delegation on the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era", which was published on the occasion of Disarmament Week and dated 23 October 1992, under General Assembly reference A/C.1/47/7. At first glance one notes that this

report is generally structured around the principal theme of expanding the role of the United Nations in efforts to achieve international disarmament. We consider that it is realistic to present disarmament as envisaged in the report, as an instrument for establishing international peace and mutual trust among States. In our view too, disarmament can be justified at the international level only if it is seen as a means of achieving peace rather than as an end in itself. The current period offers us a historic opportunity in the globalization of disarmament. In other words, the time is ripe for disarmament to become a reality for the entire international community rather than confining itself to a specific situation in which East and West go through important stages.

My delegation shares the views of the Secretary-General set out in the first and second parts of his report, entitled respectively "Integration: Disarmament in the new international environment" and "Globalization: Enhancing the multinational approach". However, in the first part a narrow view of disarmament which reduces it to the mere neutralization of armaments in the framework of peacemaking and peacekeeping operations did not escape our attention. In other words, my delegation had the impression that disarmament was to some extent confused with the concept of neutralization. In our view a conceptual distinction is necessary between instruments such as the Treaty on conventional forces in Europe or the chemical weapons Convention and, for example, neutralization measures undertaken in Iraq under Security Council resolutions. We consider that it would be more correct to perceive disarmament efforts in this new international order as international legal arrangements that can succeed only through global negotiations that are open to all interested States. Thus they are not isolated cases of neutralization of armaments or demobilization. Moreover, the passage in paragraph 13 on a possible United Nations response to grave violations of disarmament agreements or of other threats to peace gives further grounds for thinking that it reduces the meaning of disarmament as mentioned in the Iraqi example. In our view any breach of a disarmament agreement that had previously been negotiated among parties, or any violation of disarmament-related provisions of treaties signed pursuant to peace conferences, are also acts that are of equal gravity and warrant a clear response. My delegation would have preferred this report to focus more on this latter question. As to the general approach which we find in this first part of the report, in so far as it stipulates the complementarity of conflict prevention measures and disarmament, this approach fully corresponds with the views of my delegation.

In the second part, which is entitled "Globalization: Enhancing the multilateral approach", emphasis is given to the evils of the conventional arms race and excessive transfers of arms. Attention is very rightly drawn to the alarming situation in the Middle East. Yet on reading this section it would appear that the danger of nuclear armaments takes second place to the conventional threat. That does not correspond to our way of thinking because despite the recent positive results achieved in the field of disarmament, the risks of proliferation in this field mean that the nuclear threat continues to grow. It would therefore be preferable to give equivalent attention to these two dangers in this part of the report.

(Mr. Arar, Turkey)

We fully concur with the views of the Secretary-General concerning weapons of mass destruction, efforts to prevent proliferation, arms transfers and transparency in armaments and other confidence-building measures, as set out in the third part of the report, entitled "Revitalization: Building on past achievements". A very important element which emerges from this study is the clear demonstration of the fact that disarmament is becoming more and more everybody's business. My delegation fully endorses the viewpoint expressed in paragraph 18 that United Nations bodies in particular can play a much more significant role in the globalization of disarmament. Of course, this paragraph is directly linked to paragraph 45, in which the Secretary-General puts forward the idea that the time has come to proceed from exploratory discussions to practical actions in redefining the role of the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation expresses its appreciation to Ambassador Servais of Belgium for having undertaken consultations on this subject, and feels that this year the Conference must focus on this crucial issue. We think that it is time for the Conference on Disarmament to recognize the far-reaching changes that have occurred in the world and to adjust its priorities accordingly. This will require a restructuring of this body and a readaptation of its agenda. This exercise requires a focusing on more pragmatic objectives so as to allow discussion of subjects directly linked with international security. During that exercise changes in the membership of the Conference deserve indepth consideration.

The radical changes taking place in the world compel much broader participation in the work of the Conference as well as in sharing its responsibilities in order to arrive at global programmes of disarmament with as many inputs as possible. The status quo in this body will not serve that cause. We must consider ways and means of opening the Conference up to other members of the international community which are prepared to contribute to its activities in an effective manner. Allow me to recall that Turkey, a country which plays a positive role in the area of arms control and disarmament in Europe and other regions of the world, has already informed all the parties concerned of its intention to take part in and contribute actively to the work of the Conference with the status of a full member.

In general terms this report of the Secretary-General, while it makes a realistic assessment of the present situation and the needs arising from it, does not identify specific action to be undertaken under the aegis of the United Nations regionally and internationally to meet these needs. The explanation for this situation may be that the report is an inventory which has been prepared to draw attention to the various aspects of disarmament. To be more precise, we have before us a document which is the product of serious work and which warrants consideration in the framework of international disarmament efforts. We hope that this report will mark the first phase of complementary

conceptual and detailed work to be done in the future by the relevant United Nations bodies in the field of disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Turkey for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I have no other delegation inscribed to speak today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? If not, I now give the floor to the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for a statement concerning services to be allocated to the Conference.

Mr. BERASATEGUI (Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): We are mandated by the General Assembly to report to the Conference on the services to be assigned to it during the 1993 session. As in previous sessions, the Conference will be allocated 10 meetings per week with full servicing, and 15 meetings per week with full services during the sessions of the Seismic Group. In other words, we should be able to hold two daily meetings with full servicing throughout the whole of the 1993 session, plus one additional daily meeting when the Seismic Group is in session.

As the work of the Conference intensifies, it may be necessary to hold meetings of subsidiary bodies consecutively with other committees or working groups. This practice has in the past prevented the waste of allocated resources in the event of early adjournment of meetings. In this respect, punctuality in starting meetings of the Conference is also important. It is also understood that meetings with full services cannot be held in the evening or during weekends.

I also wish to recall that measures accepted by the Conference at the informal meeting held on 22 April 1986 concerning savings in documentation continue to be valid. In order to implement these decisions, all documents need to be presented well in advance and duplication of documentation should be avoided.

Another question which I should like to address is the need for the secretariat to have as soon as possible the letters of accreditation of all delegations, so as to extend the passes granting access to the Conference's rooms, because of other important meetings at the highest level of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to be held close to the area of the Council Chamber during the coming days. Security measures are being strengthened and members will be requested by security personnel to identify themselves. Those other meetings will begin this weekend and continue early next week. May I suggest that members carry with them either the CD passes or at least the identification provided by the United Nations Office at Geneva?

As regards conference room facilities available for the CD, they will be - in addition to the Council Chamber - room I, the conference room on the sixth floor in the area of the Disarmament secretariat and either rooms C-108 or H-3, depending on the overall requirements facing the Conference Services Division of the United Nations Office at Geneva. I wish only to suggest that, when

delegations need such facilities for their consultations, they kindly address a request to the Conference Officer, Ms. Pasqualin, who is responsible for assigning such services, in order to avoid any overlapping.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for his statement. We have now concluded our business for this plenary meeting, except for the presidential statement on the organization of work, so may I ask now whether we are ready to proceed? Ambassador of India, may I ask you personally if we are ready to proceed? Ambassador of India, you have the floor.

Mr. CHANDRA (India): Mr. President, I haven't yet received what I had expected and I leave it up to you to decide how we should proceed.

The PRESIDENT: From what I understand, we have now two possibilities that I discussed in the preparation of work. I don't want to go into them again in this formal meeting, so unless I hear anything to the contrary, I will suspend the meeting and take it up again as soon as possible in the afternoon. I have to ask the secretariat what is "as soon as possible in the afternoon" in terms of interpretation and other services.

Mr. BERASATEGUI (Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): Any time from 3 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: So, given that information, I think I shall now suspend this plenary meeting and resume at 3 p.m. sharp. Ambassador Ledogar of the United States has the floor.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): I, and the other members of my delegation, have a number of appointments this afternoon. We had not in any way planned for a plenary session of the Conference on Disarmament. On the other hand, some of these other appointments can be readjusted, but I would not want to be required to come back here and wait for another two and a half hours for suspected telephone conversations. I wonder if there is some positive way that we could know that if we had to come back here and rearrange our calendars, it would be for a purpose, and not just for continued delay.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Ambassador Ledogar. I think we should now maybe move to an informal meeting if you agree, because I don't think we should have these exchanges in the record. So if you agree, we are now in an informal meeting.

The plenary meeting was suspended at 12.40 p.m. and resumed at 3.10 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 637th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

As I announced this morning, we shall proceed to the question of the organization of the work of the Conference, as contained in the draft presidential statement circulated this morning by the secretariat. As you know, we suspended the plenary meeting this morning in the expectation that

(The President)

all members would be in a position now to proceed with the presidential statement. Before I proceed to read out the presidential statement, I should like to ask whether we are ready to go along with it now. I hear no remark and no one asking for the floor, so I will now read out the presidential statement.

"1. There is an understanding in the Conference that, at the outset of its 1993 session, the Conference decides to adopt as its agenda the agenda of its 1992 session, while noting that its ongoing consultations on the review of this agenda will be intensified:

1. Nuclear test ban.

2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

3. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.

4. Prevention of an arms race in outer space.

5. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

6. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.

7. Comprehensive programme of disarmament.

8. Transparency in armaments.

9. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

"2. The Conference further agrees, without prejudice to any future decisions on the organizational framework of other items, to begin its work immediately on: 'Nuclear test ban', 'Prevention of an arms race in outer space', 'Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons' and 'Transparency in armaments'. For this purpose, the Conference establishes ad hoc committees on these items with the following mandates:

- Nuclear test ban: the result of the 1992 consultations conducted by the special coordinator on this item (CD/1179);

- Prevention of an arms race in outer space: document CD/1125;

(The President)

- Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons: document CD/1121;

- Transparency in armaments: the decision of the Conference on 26 May 1992 (document CD/1150).

"3. The Conference also recalls its decision to intensify its consultations on its improved and effective functioning, including its decision to carry out consultations on the issues of its membership and agenda. For this purpose, I confirm that I shall appoint two special coordinators to conduct consultations on the issues of membership and agenda.

"Lastly, I understand that it is the intention of interested members to continue their ongoing open-ended informal consultations on non-proliferation in all its aspects."

Mr. AZIKIWE (Nigeria): On behalf of the Group of 21, I should like to make the following statement. The Group of 21 has gone along with the contents of the presidential statement just delivered with the understanding that the course of action agreed to today in no way affects the established priorities in disarmament. It is the hope of the Group that this course of action will allow the Conference to proceed expeditiously with its work at the beginning of the 1993 session.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Ambassador of Nigeria for his statement in the name of the Group of 21. I have no other business for today and I intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 26 January, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 3.20 p.m.

CD/PV.638
26 January 1993

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND THIRTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 26 January 1993, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Celso Luiz Nunes Amorim (Brazil)

GE.93-60140 (E)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 638th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

Before we proceed with our business at this plenary meeting, I should like to refer to a suggestion that I requested the Secretary-General to transmit to you on Friday, concerning the holding today of an informal meeting to discuss the request addressed to the Conference by the General Assembly in its decision adopted on 9 December 1992. In accordance with subparagraph (c) of that decision, the Conference on Disarmament is requested to transmit to the resumed session of the First Committee, by 15 February 1993, the results of its consideration of the report of the Secretary-General entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era", as well as the status of its ongoing review of its agenda, composition and methods of work, by 20 February 1993.

As time is now of the essence, it seems to me that it would be appropriate to discuss this question today, so that we might exchange preliminary views on the two issues. Several representatives contacted me yesterday, expressing agreement with this suggestion, on the understanding that, on this occasion, the informal meeting should be held with the participation of members only. If there is no objection, we shall then proceed with the informal meeting, as envisaged, immediately after this plenary meeting.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The representative of Romania, Ambassador Neagu, is inscribed to address this plenary meeting, and I now give him the floor.

Mr. NEAGU (Romania): Mr. President, allow me, first of all, to express my delegation's deep satisfaction at having the privilege to start the current session of the Conference on Disarmament under your able guidance. I assure you of my delegation's full cooperation towards the success of your endeavours. I am convinced that your talent and experience will guide our deliberations productively and also innovatively. I would like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation and respect to the past President, Ambassador Michel Servais of Belgium, and to thank him for the excellent work he has done during his presidency. I would also like to avail myself of this opportunity to welcome our new colleagues who have lately taken up their posts at the Conference on Disarmament: His Excellency Mr. Huan Archibaldo Lanús of Argentina, His Excellency Dr. Wolfgang Hoffmann of Germany, His Excellency Satish Chandra of India, His Excellency Don Nanjira of Kenya and His Excellency Lars Norberg of Sweden.

The outset of the 1993 session of the Conference on Disarmament is taking place in an encouraging, though still fragile world environment, offering new, sometimes contradictory opportunities. The East-West confrontation and its global corollaries - ideological rivalry and bloc politics - no longer dominate the international landscape. These fundamental changes have created a different

system with potential areas of insecurity in which many States lack military protection. At the same time, there has been a marked

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

broadening and deepening of the dimensions of disarmament. Beyond the mere regulation of armaments and the arms race, disarmament agreements include now the destruction of existing arsenals and the limitation of future production.

The last year and a half has been successful and rich for arms control and disarmament, with remarkable progress in arms limitation, including: the initiatives of the United States and the former Soviet Union to withdraw and destroy most of their tactical nuclear weapons; the agreement by the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals; the addition of the ranks of adherents to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty of a number of the most significant previous hold-outs; the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which seeks to establish a stable and secure balance of conventional forces at lower levels, and which has been previously applied in all its aspects; the signature of the Treaty on open skies that eventually could extend to regions well beyond its original area of application, i.e. Europe, Canada and the United States; and the completion of a comprehensive chemical weapons Convention.

Taking advantage of the opportunities created by the transformation of the global security environment, the United States and Russia agreed to the most far-reaching cuts in nuclear arsenals since the dawn of the atomic age, the highest point of which was attained only three weeks ago by the signature of the Treaty on F,3
urther Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II). The Romanian Government warmly welcomed and expressed great satisfaction with the conclusion of the new agreement, which represents a milestone in the quest for nuclear disarmament. The START II agreement, which will reduce by two thirds the current levels of strategic offensive nuclear weapons in the United States and Russia, is a product of bilateral dialogue and mutual concessions and benefits both sides, as well as the entire international community. It also symbolizes the new partnership between the United States and Russia in the post-cold-war era and the new relationship in the broader context and dimensions of that Euro-Atlantic space and in the whole world. The well-crafted and significant START II agreement will enhance security and stability - both militarily and politically - on the international scene and will give impetus to bilateral, regional and multilateral efforts aimed at eliminating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction around the world.

On a broader level, the Conference on Disarmament has proven its ability to serve as the single negotiating body for multilateral disarmament. The chemical weapons Convention (CWC), which in the recent past had been the main focus of our attention, was signed in Paris, two weeks ago, by 130 States. The completion of this landmark convention is historic in its complexity and scale. Never before have so many countries undertaken so far-reaching and intrusive a treaty to completely ban an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. The Convention is

the much needed impetus for efforts to seek solutions at the negotiating table and represents a welcome step in addressing regional and world security concerns. It is the first agreement with an effective verification regime allowing on-site inspections of any facility suspected of non-compliance. Most important, this truly non-discriminatory

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

instrument establishes an international norm that delegitimizes and stigmatizes possession of chemical weapons. In all these regards and despite some inherent imperfections, the CWC may serve as a model for future disarmament accords. Adherence to it should, therefore, be universal.

The CWC will help in improving the regime under another important international instrument - the 1972 biological weapons Convention. This latter agreement, aimed at excluding completely the possibility of biological agents and toxins being used as weapons, represented a real turning-point in the modern age, for it was the first international document since the Second World War to provide for the actual elimination of an abhorrent weapon from the arsenals of nations. The success of the third 1991 review conference, which inter alia mandated an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint, serves as testimony to the interest in and commitment to the Convention.

The CWC may also serve as an example for improving the definition of biological weapons, so as to take into account recent developments in biosciences. In fact, the two regimes might over time be harmonized, the more that, with the accomplishment of the CWC and with the BWC in place, both categories of weapons of mass destruction have now been outlawed for ever and represent indispensable elements in global efforts to deal effectively with weapons of mass destruction.

As the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania stated in Paris on 14 January, "completing the negotiation and the successful signing ceremony are only the first steps toward achieving the Convention's fundamental objectives. Much work should be done in the coming months by the Preparatory Commission for the future Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and by individual States, in order to secure smooth implementation of the provisions of the Convention. The Romanian delegation, which participated during all past years in the complex negotiation on the CWC, envisages quick ratification of the Convention by the Romanian Parliament. My country is ready to play an active role, at all levels, in the implementation of the Convention, including the Prepcom or the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat of the future OPCW".

The newly signed strategic arms reduction Treaty and the chemical weapons Convention are important steps towards bringing into fruition a foundation for a rather comprehensive arms control regime and could play a key role in fulfilling our pledge to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

The proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction and the spread of technology related to research on or production of such weapons constitute a threat to international peace and are likely to dominate security concerns of people in the coming decade. In this connection the proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of the most burning security issues of our time. In our view, it

is necessary to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, of which the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty is the fundamental pillar. So far, the NPT

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remains an indispensable framework for our global non-proliferation efforts. The recent accession of a number of States to the Treaty and the intentions of the new republics of the former Soviet Union to follow suit, the conclusion by other States of various agreements on nuclear safeguards with IAEA, the commitment of the United States of America to the NPT's indefinite extension, as well as the adoption by the United States, the Russian Federation and France of unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing are most positive, welcome developments. All the permanent members of the Security Council have now become parties to this Treaty, which is vital for the survival of mankind.

However, non-proliferation of nuclear arms cannot be taken for granted. There are continuing challenges to the NPT which, if ignored, could undermine the credibility and effectiveness of the Treaty. There are worrying proliferation pressures in different regions of the world while some countries with significant nuclear activities remain outside the Treaty. Though progress has been made in super-Power nuclear arms control, more needs to be done. True, the invention of the atomic bomb cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, if these weapons continue to be in the arsenals of some nations, even at low numbers, yet without a commitment to go down to a close-to-zero minimum - if reduction to zero seems impossible for the time being - the invitation for horizontal proliferation would persist. There are also doubts that IAEA has the necessary resources, both human and financial, to carry out its international legal responsibilities in the application of safeguards at a time when there are significant developments in the nuclear fuel cycle.

Romania reconfirms its full support for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and for universal adherence to it. While emphasizing the vital role in the implementation of the Treaty of fully effective IAEA safeguards, as well as the importance of effective export controls, my Government is firmly in favour of the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT at the 1995 review conference.

The conclusion of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing has become a major issue in the context of the non-proliferation Treaty, of nuclear disarmament in general. The pressure for a comprehensive test ban has arisen especially in United Nations forums, including the First Committee of the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission, and in our Conference on Disarmament. Work has also been done on the issue of seismic verification of a test ban in the Group of Scientific Experts under the auspices of the Conference on Disarmament. The PTBT amendment conference served to bring the problems into prominence once again amongst participating States. At the same time, the recent United States decision on nuclear tests proves that approaches to this problem are changing in a constructive direction. A comprehensive ban on nuclear testing would decisively contribute to halting the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and thus would be a significant step leading to the goal of the elimination, in the long run, of all nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

We deem it necessary that, in light of the emerging favourable situation, the CD should impart a new impulse to our progress towards a complete ban on nuclear tests and step up efforts to find generally accepted and effective practical solutions to the remaining problems in this domain. The recent re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban provides the necessary framework for fruitful discussion aimed at concluding a treaty banning all nuclear explosions for test purposes at the earliest possible time. However, my delegation does not subscribe to any linkage between the achievement of a comprehensive test ban and the decision to be taken on the extension of the NPT. Any weakening of the non-proliferation regime and any spread of nuclear weapons beyond the States which have them already will undermine international security, and we simply cannot afford to take that risk.

Potential spread of the capability to produce or acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them constitute a growing threat to international security. There can be no justification to acquire the tools and technologies of mass destruction at a moment when real progress and substantial disarmament are finally beginning to occur. Years ago the world community began to develop a regime aimed at creating responsible proliferation control, not only of nuclear, biological and chemical arms, but also of long-range delivery systems and dual-use technologies, due to the growing threat posed by some States that have the potential capability and the will to produce them secretly, unwise export policies, regional destabilization following the end of the cold war and the proliferation of technology in general. Such controls should be balanced and fair and, in order to be effective, must not hamper the peaceful uses of science and technology.

As is well known, the export regimes aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons are based on the NPT, while the export of nuclear items usually falls under the heading of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Considerable efforts have been made to improve the rules on preventing the spread of biological and chemical weapons and their precursors, which now have their roots in the BWC and, hopefully, the CWC. Guidelines for nuclear, biological and chemical transfers have been established in the frameworks of international bodies and groupings, such as the "London Club", "Nuclear Suppliers' Guidelines", the NPT Exporters Committee (also called the Zanger Committee), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the "Australia Group". At national levels, export regimes aim at preventing the export of commercial goods to certain destinations and constitute an instrument to control and prevent the proliferation of merchandise, which could contribute to undesired arms developments in receiving States.

The Romanian Government reiterates its commitment to the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missiles capable of carrying such weapons and missile technology. It is in this spirit that my Government

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has adhered to the Nuclear Suppliers' Group and has publicly committed itself to respect MTCR and other groupings' guidelines. My Government has decided to join all these international bodies and is determined to further cooperate with partner States in reaching the major goals of non-proliferation. To this end and in order to assure full respect of these guidelines at the national level, as well as to give itself the means to control that through its national legislation and law enforcement authority, the Romanian Government adopted, on 28 September 1992, decision No. 594 on "the import and export regime of items and technologies under final destination control, as well as on the export control regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and of missiles carrying such weapons". This document, which has been distributed as document CD/1178, is self-explanatory. It represents indeed a true and efficient legal instrument which establishes an effective system ensuring that the Romanian technology is used solely for economic development, not diverted to military purposes or to unintended
countries. It ensures at the national level the appropriate regulations and machinery which would guarantee the strict control of the non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and also cooperation with other States on these issues.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Neagu of Romania for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. Does any other member wish to take the floor at this stage?

I don't see any request for the floor, so I shall now turn to other business. The secretariat has circulated a note by the President, contained in document CD/WP.439, relating to requests from non-members to participate in the work of the Conference. So far, no objection has been raised in connection with the communications attached to that note. This being the case, may I suggest that we adopt the recommendation contained in the document directly in plenary, on the understanding that this does not set a precedent for future occasions when an informal meeting may be necessary? May I take it that the Conference takes action as recommended?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: You will recall that, at our last plenary meeting, I made a statement as President of the Conference on organizational arrangements for our future work. I stated that, as announced previously, I would appoint two special co-ordinators to conduct consultations on the issues of membership and the agenda. I shall do so very soon, as their contribution to our work in the coming weeks will be particularly important in the process of preparation of the report to be transmitted to the First Committee of the General Assembly on those subjects with which they will be dealing.

I have invited the group co-ordinators to intensify their consultations on the chairmanships of the various ad hoc committees and I would like to do so with

the members of the Conference. I hope that we will be in a position a proceed to appoint all chairmen at our next plenary meeting, so that the subsidiary bodies might start their work immediately.

(The President)

In accordance with the decision taken today at the beginning of this session, I intend now to adjourn the plenary meeting and convene an informal meeting of the Conference to consider the question of the reports that the Conference will transmit to the First Committee of the General Assembly.

Before we adjourn the plenary meeting, I wish to inform you that, at our next plenary meeting on Thursday, His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt will be our first speaker. The Minister intends to arrive punctually and I trust that we shall then be in a position to start our proceedings without any delay.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 28 January, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.45 a.m.

CD/PV.639
28 January 1993

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND THIRTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday 28 January 1993, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Celso Luiz Nunes Amorim (Brazil)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 639th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I wish to extend a warm welcome, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, His Excellency Amre Moussa, who is inscribed to address the Conference today. The Minister has had a brilliant diplomatic career and has great experience in multilateral affairs. He has served three times with the United Nations in New York, in the third instance as Permanent Representative, and has twice been Director of the Department of International Organizations in the Foreign Ministry. He has participated in many international conferences and, in particular, in special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. I am sure that the Minister's statement will be followed by all of us with great interest.

I have on my list of speakers today the representatives of Egypt and India. I now give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, His Excellency Amre Moussa.

Mr. MOUSSA (Egypt): Thank you, Mr. President, for the kind and generous words of welcome that you have extended to me. I am pleased to have the opportunity to share my thoughts with this august body as it starts its annual session in the wake of the conclusion of several historic agreements such as START II and the chemical weapons Convention. And I find it highly appropriate that the Conference is chaired at this time by a representative of Brazil, a country that has played an active and highly constructive role in the field of disarmament in nuclear as well as in the other domains, in both global and regional contexts of disarmament. I would also like to seize this occasion to express my appreciation to Ambassador Berasategui, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, for his untiring efforts at the CD and his contribution to its work.

As you are well aware, the last few years have been tumultuous times of change. Bipolarism and its antecedents have literally crumbled before our eyes, and we live today in extremely fluid political circumstances, which truly test the wisdom and compassion of world leaders. Are they to succeed in harnessing the exuberant quest for change, freedom, and national expression with all its vibrant passions and emotions, in order to establish a better, more humane world, where equal rights and the rule of law reign supreme? Or will they become once again party to the reorganization of the world order on the basis of strength and weakness and the same archaic attitudes of bipolarism, which consider diversity as a source of concern and perturbation to be confronted, rather than a wealth of rich resources upon which to establish a truly global community of nations?

The true test of time is whether we will be able to raise our national, regional and global political rationale to levels commensurate with the challenges of the present and the hopes for the future, rather than attempt to tailor these challenges to fit the global body politic we established in the past. In these challenging times, where concepts and delineations have to be reviewed, most relevant to the work of your Conference is how we define the concept of security. Traditionally this has been defined in military terms alone. However, over the years, the political dimension of security, with its

(Mr. Moussa, Egypt)

social, economic and environmental pillars, has gradually gained ground, and the term now, for many, including Egypt, has a multi-dimensional definition which, in its wider context, often extends beyond the mere protection of national geographical boundaries.

Realizing these new dimensions of security, Egypt has been instrumental in initiating discussions on this issue in several different regional and extraregional contexts. In the Arab League on Arab security; within the Organization of African Unity on African security; within the Middle East peace talks on regional security; as well as calling for the establishment of a Mediterranean forum for dialogue amongst countries on both shores of those warm waters. Admittedly, the military dimension remains prominent and overarmament remains prevalent throughout the world. This is a challenge that we in the international community, and you as a conference on disarmament in particular, must address seriously.

I would like to seize this opportunity to call for the elaboration of a new approach to international security - one based on a new definition that rises to the challenges of our times. Security found in "common interests", rather than "expressions of military force or checks and balances". In so doing, two fundamental parameters should remain at the forefront of our concerns. Firstly, security should be achieved at lower levels of armament. In our changing world, with security more and more being defined in non-military terms, the present levels of armament are neither politically nor morally justifiable. Secondly, States should have equal obligations and make equal commitments in the field of disarmament. Where disarmament agreements are possible, they should entail equal rights and responsibilities. International relations should now provide an equitable launching pad for new horizons and cooperation in the field of security. This is particularly true in the regional context, where inequality breeds suspicion and sows the seeds of conflict.

These objectives, with the concepts and principles they are based upon, provide the guiding light for the positions that my country has traditionally adopted in the realm of disarmament, and for the formulation of the immediate objectives that she pursues, both on a global as well as regional level. In this vein, we have consistently striven for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, be they nuclear, chemical, or biological. For example, in 1968, Egypt was amongst the original signatories of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, because of her unwavering commitment to the elimination of these weapons, and our fervent hope that by taking this high road other States, in and beyond our region, but especially in our region, would be encouraged to do the same.

Six years later, frustrated by the lack of response, Egypt, together with Iran, co-sponsored a proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Another seven years passed without retribution. Yet true to our conviction, in 1981 we again took the high road and ratified the NPT. It is also pertinent to point out that Arab countries have either ratified the NPT or

(Mr. Moussa, Egypt)

entered into full safeguard agreements with IAEA. Regrettably the result was the same.

We then decided to try a different approach, and actively engage the international community, as well as our regional partners, Israel in particular, in a comprehensive approach for dealing with weapons of mass destruction. The objective was to take into account issues that had gained increasing concern, such as chemical weapon disarmament. In April of 1990 President Mubarak proposed that all weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, be eliminated from the Middle East. This proposal was embraced by the Arab world. We were all thus committing ourselves to eliminating all these weapons, including chemical weapons, even before you here at the CD had concluded your work on the convention prohibiting chemical weapons.

This proposal has gradually gained wide-ranging support, with more extraregional parties endorsing it. I would like to emphasize in this regard that our commitment to its objectives are only surpassed by our determination to safeguard our own security interests, and indeed those of the Arab world and the Middle East as a whole, security interests that can only be truly ensured if based on effective, verifiable, reciprocal arrangements.

Recently, at the ceremony in Paris opening the CWC for signature, Foreign Minister Peres of Israel briefly touched upon elements that related to our proposal of April 1990. I do not intend to discuss these elements here, whether those that we are inclined to support, such as comprehensiveness of approach, or those which we may interpret differently, such as conditionality. I would however like to welcome Israel's first indication of readiness to be engaged on weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. Yet I feel compelled at the same time to urge Israel to make full use of the potential for concrete progress that exists at present, rather than postpone and condition freeing the Middle East from the dangers of weapons of mass destruction until after peace has been achieved in the region.

Egypt on her part, intends to intensify here contacts in this regard with all her regional partners, including Israel, both bilaterally, as well as multilaterally within the context of the Middle East arms control talks. Hopefully, in the near future we will be able to reach conclusions which will find tangible expression by all sides in the nuclear as well as chemical fields.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons comes up for extension in 1995. While it is not directly before you for consideration, many of its elements are dealt with here in one form or the other. Nuclear disarmament is a prominent, albeit inactive item on your agenda. I find it perplexing that you are not more active in this regard, particularly at a time when significant global achievements have been made, most recently START II.

CTBT and security assurances are other such issues. It is our sincere hope that your Conference will generate agreements on these issues of paramount

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importance to nuclear non-proliferation. And, without prejudice to negotiations that may be occurring bilaterally, we do believe that the Conference on Disarmament can play a constructive role in limiting vertical and horizontal proliferation, and in adopting further, more comprehensive measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear States against the use of nuclear weapons. A new look by you all at the concept of positive and negative assurances is required and opportune, now that the counterbalancing complexities of the NATO-Warsaw security relationships are behind us.

Another question of great importance is how to ensure that NPT, or the non-proliferation regime which has the NPT as its cornerstone, truly acquires a universal character. NPT parties and non-parties alike must find ways and means to achieve the objective which they have all professed to aspire to, "... preventing the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons". The 1995 NPT conference provides us with the opportunity to come together and develop a new nuclear non-proliferation contract for the twenty-first century. A contract, with the NPT as its core, but encompassing associations with States that have remained beyond it while supporting its nuclear non-proliferation objectives. For example, closer association between NPT and regional arrangements could be a beneficial and auspicious beginning.

We have all witnessed some newly emerging trends in the field of disarmament during the last few years. Issues such as arms transfers and transparency have become increasingly topical in the global and regional disarmament debate. I must admit we have followed these trends with mixed feelings. On the one hand, we share the view that overarmament is rampant and must be addressed, thus do not object to the declared objectives of controlling arms transfers - quite the contrary, we endorse them. We also believe that greater transparency is imperative for successful disarmament negotiations, and are therefore enthusiastic about the emergence of this trend as well. On the other hand, I cannot but admit to being disappointed as to the piecemeal, tailor-made manner in which some of these issues are being dealt with. While the professed objective of regulating arms transfers is to prevent over-armament, and the proliferation of destabilizing weapons, this whole exercise has been limited to importing and exporting of conventional weapons. We wonder, do not domestic military industrial production capabilities provide for a significant, often major portion of the aggregate military arsenals? And would we not be exacerbating already unstable situations if, by limiting our endeavours to imports and exports, we provided an added advantage, quantitatively or qualitatively, to States with developed military industries? We have similar questions with regard to transparency. Why is it that weapons of mass destruction or their relevant technology are not covered by such measures? Cannot they be equally destabilizing? Are they not subject to disarmament negotiations? Are we not all interested in eliminating these weapons as well?

Of course, it can always be said that the measures suggested thus far constitute only a beginning to be built upon, and, that functionality and practicality compel us to start with a limited agenda. We understand these

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arguments and are not insensitive to them. However, we have strong convictions that to be fully effective, disarmament measures must be balanced and fair. They must not unduly hamper the peaceful uses of science and technology. And they should not divide the world into invidious categories of "haves" and "have-nots".

Finally, I wish to express our gratitude to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for his report entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era". The report make a number of interesting proposals and suggestions, which Egypt will address in detail through the appropriate channels. I would like to highlight however that we fully support the conclusion reached that "a globalization of the process of arms control and disarmament is now needed". We believe that your Conference in particular has an invaluable role to play in giving tangible expression to the thought, and hope to see an active role for your Conference in developing the disarmament agenda for the twenty-first century.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, Amre Moussa, for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair and especially those he addressed to my country. They testify to the excellent cooperation between Brazil and Egypt. I now give the floor to the representative of India, Ambassador Satish Chandra.

Mr. CHANDRA (India): Mr. President, since this is the first occasion that I am taking the floor to speak substantively in this body, permit me at the outset to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I fully share the sentiments of all our colleagues here that under your guidance and leadership, 1993 will be a successful year for the CD. I would also like to thank all those who addressed warm words of welcome to me and spoke so kindly of my predecessor.

I have heard, with great attention, the thought-provoking statement of His Excellency Mr. Amre Moussa, the Foreign Minister of Egypt. For me personally, it was both a pleasure and a privilege to see him here, and to hear him speak with his customary precision and clarity, because he comes from a country close to us, and because I have had the honour of interacting with him a few years ago when he was representing his great country in New Delhi.

I would also like to avail of this opportunity to congratulate the Conference on Disarmament and all the dramatis personae involved who so painstakingly and skilfully hammered out the chemicals weapons Convention and made possible its recent signature at Paris. This Convention has garnered near-universal acclaim and rightly so as it is the first global, non-discriminatory and multilateral agreement that provides for the complete prohibition and elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. A remarkable and indeed distinguishing feature of the Convention is the stringent standard of verification which is much more far-reaching than in any other disarmament agreement so far concluded. This Convention

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fulfils India's long-standing desire to seek the complete elimination of chemical weapons through a regime which is universally applicable and non-discriminatory in character. It is our hope that once the Convention comes into effect, all existing discriminatory restrictions outside the scope of the treaty which are based either on unilateral actions or on export control regimes not consonant with the Convention will cease to exist amongst the States parties. India, on its part, is totally committed not to acquire or produce chemical weapons stemming from its unreserved commitment to the purposes and objectives of the chemical weapons Convention. Indeed, even prior to becoming a signatory, India had instituted a series of export restraints to ensure that dual-purpose chemicals are used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

1992 has been an eventful year for disarmament because, apart from the successful negotiation of the chemical weapons Convention, we have seen the conclusion of START II between the United States of America and the Russian Federation. Both countries richly deserve our commendation for having reached this agreement as it will reduce by about two thirds the numbers of warheads on all delivery systems by the year 2003. START II thus, undoubtedly, makes an important contribution in furthering mutual confidence and consolidating the climate for peace. The conclusion of the negotiations leading to START II in so short a time-frame clearly demonstrates that even complex disarmament issues can be resolved with despatch given the necessary political will.

It is in this context that India proposed at SSOD-III an outline of an action plan for achieving our goal of a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order. The central focus of this action plan is the elimination of all nuclear weapons in three stages, recognizing the need for flexibility in staging some of the measures proposed. Among the nuclear disarmament measures envisaged in the plan are a ban on the production of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade fissionable material, a moratorium on testing of nuclear weapons, a comprehensive test-ban treaty and negotiations on an international convention outlawing the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It also envisages the eventual elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. This plan, tabled as CD/859 on 15 August 1988, is still eminently relevant.

Coming to the agenda of the CD, we are somewhat disappointed to note that it has been prevented from effectively discharging its responsibility on the items that have been accorded the highest priority, namely, the nuclear items. Thus, over the years, ad hoc committees have not been set up on agenda item 2 - Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament - and agenda item 3 - Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters. In keeping with the action plan tabled by us and in keeping with the call by the tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held in Jakarta in September 1992, we feel that priority in negotiations should be given to agenda items 2 and 3 as well as the nuclear test ban, security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It is, in our view, not desirable to set up ad hoc committees on other items to the exclusion of

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agenda items 2 and 3, which are amongst the most important, as it de-prioritizes them. The centrality of nuclear issues in the disarmament agenda must be maintained if we are to genuinely look to a non-violent and nuclear-weapon-free world.

As a country which has always been in the forefront in the cause of disarmament, India has naturally given serious thought and consideration to the report of the Secretary-General on "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era". We are in full accord with the view expressed by the Secretary-General that the international community must "aim for no less a goal than the complete elimination of nuclear weapons" and that "the full array of hazards posed to humanity by these weapons cannot be adequately dealt with until we have crossed the threshold of the post-nuclear-weapon age". It is our submission that this key objective must never be lost sight of as it is central to the theme of disarmament. We should not forget that, commendable as has been START II, even after the cuts envisaged under it have been undertaken, the nuclear-weapon States will still have awesome arsenals capable of destroying the world several times over and dividing the globe into "haves" and "have-nots". We must, therefore, seek to build on and beyond START II. It is our hope that START II will pave the way for commencement of multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament involving not only the United States and the Russian Federation but all other nuclear-weapon States as well. This move must be inspired by the vision of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons for this is a sine qua non for the long-term establishment of international peace and security based on an equitable, stable, just and cooperative world order. In today's world, there is a compelling need for nuclear-weapon States to re-examine doctrines of nuclear deterrence which have been propounded by them in the past to justify maintenance and expansion of their respective nuclear arsenals.

While we recognize that the regional approach can supplement and help in global efforts in disarmament, it may be noted that the definition of a region must encompass the full range of security concerns of the countries involved as also the practicability of the specific measures of disarmament suggested in this context. Since nations perceive their security indivisibly, compartmentalizing security through artificially designated regions cannot work. Each region has to be clearly defined with the full consensus of the participating States. Agreements have to be arrived at freely among the States concerned, taking into account the characteristics of the region. Essential pre-requisites for any such arrangement are scrupulous adherence to the basic principles of international relations such as non-interference in internal affairs, non-incitement to terrorism, secessionism or subversion and appropriate confidence-building measures. Confidence, in turn, must be enhanced on all fronts and in tandem, if security is to be enhanced. Continuance of hostile acts and inflammatory statements diminish the value of political confidence-building measures.

Within the constraints and limitations cited above, India has sought to build confidence in its neighbourhood through transparency and dialogue. The range of CBMs entered into with neighbouring countries is impressive and covers

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three broad categories - political, communications and technical. The political CBMs include "declarations of intent", discussions on security-related concepts and doctrines, measures aimed at improving people-to-people contacts, and developing a broad base for bilateral relations; the communications CBMs include the provision of communication links such as hot lines, dedicated channel links, risk reduction or conflict prevention mechanisms and periodic meetings at official level to discuss issues and defuse tensions; technical CBMs include activities relating to arms limitation and transparency, i.e., prior notification, constraints on military activities in certain zones, ceilings on military equipment, etc.

Inevitably, the range and depth of these CBMs with each of our neighbours vary depending upon the relationship and the mutuality of interest. As a point of interest, it may be noted that at the first round of Foreign-Secretary-level talks with Pakistan in July 1990, India put forward an integrated package of CBMs. The package included CBMs in all the three categories - political, communication and technical. It provided for information-sharing on military exercises as a means of promoting transparency and reducing misapprehensions, improving communications among military commanders, joint border patrolling, exchanges of delegations of armed forces and at the political level, reiteration and reaffirmation of settling disputes through peaceful means and bilateral negotiations, ceasing hostile propaganda, respecting the Line of Control and refraining from acts detrimental to maintenance of peaceful harmonious relations and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

The six rounds of Foreign-Secretary-level talks held so far have focused on carrying forward the elements of the CBM package. At the sixth round of Foreign-Secretary-level talks held in August 1992, instruments of ratification were exchanged on agreements signed on advance notice of military exercises, manoeuvres and troop movements, prevention of airspace violation and permitting overflights and landings of military aircraft. Also, at the sixth round of Foreign-Secretary-level talks, in anticipation of the multilateral, global convention on chemical weapons, India and Pakistan signed an agreement to ban the development, production and use of chemical weapons.

In the nuclear field, an agreement between India and Pakistan on the prohibition of attacks on each other's nuclear facilities was signed in December 1988. I am happy to be able to state that lists of these nuclear facilities were exchanged under this agreement for the second consecutive year on 4 January 1993. Communications between the two countries have also improved as the Directors-General of Military Operations of both countries remain in telephonic contact over the hot line on a weekly basis following the agreement at the third round of Foreign-Secretary-level talks in December 1990. As a step towards transparency, a formal invitation in August 1992 was extended to the Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan to visit India. While CBMs are not a substitute for disarmament, India is fully sensitive to the contribution of CBMs in reducing the risk of misperceptions and enhancing predictability in the conduct of inter-State relations.

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In the nuclear field, the real issue today is not the NPT or its extension as suggested in the Secretary-General's report. The real issue is how to put an end to proliferation and to eliminate nuclear weapons. Accordingly, there is a need for an international dialogue to review the NPT to plug existing loopholes and to make it an instrument for achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Extending the NPT, which is discriminatory and imperfect to begin with, and which has proved demonstrably ineffective in preventing proliferation either of nuclear weapons or of nuclear-weapon States, is not the way to achieve non-proliferation. While India shares the concerns with regard to proliferation, we do not believe that partial and unjust measures or punitive action on a selective basis will achieve the desired result. Just as chemical and biological weapons are matters of global concern to be dealt with globally, nuclear weapons and the nuclear threat cannot be addressed without a global approach. A new international understanding and consensus on what constitutes non-proliferation is urgently required so that the pursuit of a global approach to non-proliferation which is universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory is seriously attempted. If the international community is capable of achieving a convention to ban chemical weapons, there is no reason to believe that, given the political will, it will not achieve a similar convention to ban nuclear weapons. In this respect the CWC reflects the model of a future global disarmament agreement in the nuclear field in both its multilateral negotiating format as well as its universal and non-discriminatory approach.

While the CD has finally been able to complete negotiations on a global, non-discriminatory CWC, the recommendations regarding priorities in the field of disarmament endorsed by the international community at SSOD-I have never been translated into universally accepted norms, principles and processes to deal with the dangers and to eliminate the threat comprehensively. The adoption of an "arms control" approach, as distinct and different from a "disarmament" framework, has failed to arrest proliferation and is unlikely to provide a viable paradigm for the future. The Secretary-General has expressed the hope that "over the longer term, ... we may achieve more equitable and comprehensive approaches to responsible proliferation control, not only of weapons but also of long-range delivery systems and dual-use technologies". He has also expressed the view that "to be fully effective, such controls must be balanced and fair; they must not unduly hamper the peaceful uses of science and technology; and they should not divide the world into the invidious categories of 'haves' and 'have-nots'". While we fully endorse this view, we feel that this is a goal which should be achieved in the shortest time-frame possible. Closed-door "clubs", "groups" and regimes created to impose unilateral restrictions on trade in technology, equipment and material on a discriminatory basis will not prevent proliferation. Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction cannot be achieved by proposals aimed only at arms reduction, though they are welcome. Nor can initiatives which in reality only preserve the monopoly of a few States over weapons of mass destruction, missile technology and export markets for conventional weapons contribute to prevention of proliferation.

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The views of the Secretary-General on arms transfers are noteworthy. The arms build-up, spiralled by the increased military expenditure of the big military spenders and exporters of armaments, affects developing countries doubly - in the first place, the proliferating expenditure on armaments reduces the resources available for economic development and growth, and secondly, it fuels further competitive expenditure on account of perceived defence requirements for the security needs of the developing countries. India has all along advocated that steps should be taken to curb this tendency and trend. Unfortunately, without self-restraint on the part of the big industrialized arms suppliers and curtailment of financial assistance for purchase of weapons, this may just be a pipedream. We are impressed that everybody wants transparency in arms transfers but we are concerned that transparency is becoming an end in itself. In our view, transparency will serve no purpose if it does not achieve the objective of reduction in massive arms transfers. Transparency must be reflected in defence expenditure in per capita terms and as a proportion of GDP. It will necessarily have to be ensured that arms freed as a result of disarmament measures in one region are not diverted to other countries or organizations. An important dimension of transparency in armaments is the illicit arms trade which is most dangerous because of its destabilizing and destructive effects through the fuelling of phenomena like State-sponsored terrorism directed against other countries, subversion and drug trafficking.

We agree with the views of the Secretary-General on the practical importance of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. This is a global CBM. To succeed, it must however be non-discriminatory and attract universal adherence with a high degree of simultaneity.

The present disarmament machinery, we feel, is adequate to deal with the tasks at hand. The difficulty in making progress on some of the priority areas of disarmament has little to do with the present machinery. The three multilateral disarmament bodies, namely, the CD, the DC and the United Nations General Assembly, have distinct yet complementary interrelated functions. The central issue is how best to rationalize the work of these three bodies to ensure that each singly and the three in combination contribute as effectively as possible to the promotion of global cooperative security. In this context, I think we could do no better than go by the UNDC 1990 consensus report on the "Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament". The CD, as set out in the report, has a unique character and importance as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body and it is important that it continues to discharge its substantive responsibility. In this context, we do not think that it would be appropriate for the Conference to take on the role of the "permanent review and supervisory body for some existing multilateral arms regulations and disarmament agreements", as suggested in the Secretary-General's report. This would divert its attention from its prime task as a negotiating body. In a similar vein, before considering the idea of greater Security Council involvement in disarmament matters, we should ensure that the decisions emanating from it reflect consensus of the United Nations membership. It is for this reason that priority must be given to democratization of the United Nations

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Security Council and other United Nations organs. The Security Council must enjoy the confidence of the entire United Nations membership for only then will its actions carry credibility.

My delegation does not share apprehensions about the diminishing role of the Conference on Disarmament after the chemical weapons Convention. There are a number of items on the agenda of the CD which are as important as the CWC and the CD will contribute greatly to the disarmament process by taking them up for negotiations. There is no lack of agenda items to be negotiated. The danger lies in the lack of political will, fear of transparency and deliberate downgrading of the multilateral process in priority areas of disarmament. The CD should be allowed to fulfil its role as a negotiating forum and concentrate on concrete negotiation on its agenda items 1 to 3 concerning nuclear disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Chandra for this statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers for today. I ask now if there is any other representative who wishes to take the floor at this stage. If that's not the case, I have to convey to you my feeling that we have made important progress in the consultations concerning the setting up of our machinery for work, but I also understand that a short recess might be useful at this stage to finalize some aspects of these consultations and to confirm some information that I received very informally only some minutes ago. So, if you agree, I will suspend this meeting for about 10 minutes and we will resume immediately after that. I will act accordingly.

The meeting was suspended at 10.55 a.m. and resumed at 11.15 a.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 639th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

Consultations have been proceeding on the question of the chairmanships of the ad hoc committees which were set up last week. As a result of these consultations, I can invite you to take action on the appointment of the chairmen of two ad hoc committees, namely, Nuclear test ban and Prevention of an arms race in outer space. I propose that we take up first the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and appoint as Chairman Ambassador Yoshitomo Tanaka of Japan.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: We shall now turn to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. May I propose the appointment of Ambassador Wolfgang Hoffmann of Germany as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: As regards the chairmanships of the ad hoc committees on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against

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the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and on transparency in armaments, we will take them up at our next plenary meeting.

On behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, I extend to the just appointed chairmen of the ad hoc committees our congratulations on their appointment. We wish them every success in discharging the delicate responsibilities entrusted to them.

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will recall that on previous occasions, I announced my intention to appoint two special coordinators to conduct consultations on the issues of membership and the agenda. Accordingly, I have decided to appoint, as special Coordinator for the issue of membership, Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan of Australia, and for the question of the agenda, Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico. I am grateful to them for having kindly accepted their appointment, and I wish them success in their consultations. As I also stated, their contribution to the Conference's work will be particularly important in the preparation of the report to be transmitted to the First Committee of the General Assembly on those subjects with which they are now entrusted.

At the presidential consultation yesterday we agreed, at the request of Ambassador Batsanov, to hold an additional plenary meeting on

Tuesday, 2 February, at 10 a.m., to listen to the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. I trust that the Conference accepts this proposal.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: It is understood, of course, that any other member or non-member invited to participate in our work wishing to address the plenary on that day may do so.

That concludes our work for today, and I shall now proceed to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 2 February, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.20 a.m.